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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF ALI ABD UL-RAZIQ’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN ISLAM AND STATE 
 
Yigit, Öner. 
MA in Political Science and International Relations 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. İsmail Yaylacı 
July 2018, 91 pages 
 
This thesis examines the political ideas of Ali Abd ul-Raziq––an Al-Azhar scholar and a 
sharia court judge who was suspended from his duty and was stripped of his scholarly 
qualifications because of the arguments he expounded in his 1925 book, titled Al Islam 
wa Usulul Hukm. He argued that the concept of the caliphate as an instution was not 
compulsory in Islam, and hence it was not necessary to re-establish. He believed that the 
nature of the authority of the Prophet Muhammad was only spiritual. He maintained 
that neither the Prophet was a political leader, nor did he establish an Islamic state. 
Because of his ideas, Raziq is known as the “first Muslim secularist” or the founder of 
“Islamic Laicism.” In this research, I have analyzed Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s arguments and 
compared his beliefs with his contemporaries and some medieval Sunni Muslim scholars’ 
views such as Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Mawardi. The goal of the thesis is to answer 
how Raziq’s arguments differ from the other scholars, and how he justifies his 
arguments. I have argued that the political context of the 1920s such as the abolition of 
sultanate and caliphate, the discussion over the abolition among Ottoman elites, the 
political context of Egypt as well as Raziq’s personal story shaped Raziq’s arguments. 
Based on a comparative analysis, I also show that while Raziq did not have authentic 
ideas regarding the concept of the caliphate, his ideas about the nature of the authority 
of the Prophet and his companions were non-conventional and perhaps too unorthodox. 
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I speculate that Raziq could have been a pioneer of a school of thought if he developed 
his ideas regarding why and how Islam does not suggest a specific political system.  
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ÖZ 
 
ALİ ABDULRAZIK’IN İSLAM VE DEVLET İLİŞKİSİ ANLAYIŞINA DAİR BİR ANALİZ 
 
Yigit, Öner. 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi İsmail Yaylacı 
Temmuz 2018, 91 sayfa 
 
Bu tez bir dönem şeriat mahkemesinde yargıç olan El-Ezher Üniversitesi mezunu Ali 
Abdulrazık’ın siyasi görüşlerini incelemektedir. İslam’da İktidarın Temelleri, Al-Islam wa 
Usul al-Hukm, adlı kitabında savunduğu görüşleri nedeniyle görevinden alınmış ve kadılık 
unvanını 1925’te kaybetmiştir. Kurum olarak Halifelik makamının İslam’da zorunlu 
olmadığını savunmuş ve halifeliğin tekrar kurulmasının gerekli olmadığını ileri sürmüştür. 
Hz. Muhammed’in otoritesinin doğasının sadece ruhani olduğuna inanmıştır. Bununla 
beraber, Hz. Muhammed’in ne bir siyasi lider ne de İslam Devleti’ni kuran kişi olduğuna 
inanmıştır. Görüşlerinden dolayı Abdulrazık, “ilk seküler Müslüman” ya da “İslami 
Laikliğinin” kurucusu olarak tanınmaktadır.  Bu çalışmada, Ali Abdulrazık’ın argümanları 
analiz edilmiş ve görüşleri Orta çağ Müslüman Sunni alimlerinin yansıra Abdulrazık’ın 
muhaliflerinin görüşleriyle de karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu tezin amacı, Abdulrazık’ın 
argümanlarının diğer alimlerden nasıl farklılaştığını ve kendi argümanlarını nasıl 
savunduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmada, 1920lerde sultanlık ve hilafetin 
lağvedilmesinin, Osmanlı elitleri arasında mevzubahis lağvetme tartışmalarının ve 
Mısır’daki siyasi atmosferin yanısıra Razık’ın kişisel öyküsünün kendisinin argümanlarını 
şekillendirdiğini ileri sürdüm. Bununla beraber, karşılaştırmalı analiz sonucunda, 
Abdulrazık’ın hilafet kavramı konusunda orijinal fikirleri olmamakla birlikte, peygamberin 
ve sahabelerin otoritesinin doğası hakkındaki görüşlerinin oldukça alışılmışın dışında 
olduğunu gösteriyorum. Son olarak, spekülasyon yapmak gerekirse, Abdulrazık İslam’ın 
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özel olarak neden ve nasıl bir siyasal sistemi önermediği fikrini geliştirip delillerle ikna 
edici olabilseydi kendisinin öncü olduğu bir düşünce ekolü kurabilirdi.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ali Abdulrazık, İslam, Devlet, Halifelik, Din 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Does Islam propose a state model and political system? Was the Prophet Mohammed a 
political leader? Did the Prophet form an Islamic state? Is secularism compatible with 
Islam? Is there anything as the separation of religion and state in Islam? This thesis 
focuses on a scholar’s —Ali Abd ul-Raziq (1888-1966), an Egyptian former sharia judge 
and alumni of al-Azhar University— answers to these questions.  What makes Raziq’s 
arguments worth studying is that he is considered as the first “Muslim secularist” who 
tries to justify his position by giving references to Islam (Gazi, 2009). The central question 
of the thesis is how Raziq justifies his arguments about state-religion affairs in Islam. Why 
is he known as “secularist” and if so, how does he become a secular Muslim scholar? In 
this thesis, I will examine Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s two main views that made him known as a 
Muslim secularist: The concept of the caliphate as a political system and the political 
authority during the Prophet Muhammad. I will show how Ali Abd ul-Raziq challenges 
the classic theory of caliphate and how he justifies a separation of religion and state. 
Before discussing Raziq’s arguments, I briefly show how the relationship between Islam 
and state is understood by cultural essentialists and Islamist. By doing so, one can clearly 
see in the next pages see that in fact Raziq’s arguments are exactly the opposite of 
essentialists and islamists’ views. 
 
1.1. Cultural Essentialist and Islamist Views of State and Religion 
In the literature on Islam and politics, cultural essentialists or orientalists argue that Islam 
is unique, and there is an inherent distinction between Islam and other religions (Abdi, 
2017, p. 30). According to their view, the reason why Muslim majority countries have 
problems with democracy, human rights, and freedom, and so on is that Islam is the 
religion of these communities. They have mostly argued that Islam does not have a 
church, and there is no a separation between state and religion in Islam. For instance, 
Bernard Lewis writes: 
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In Islam, religion is not, as is the case in Christianity, a sector or division which 
governs certain parts of life, while others escape its grip; the Islamic religion is 
concerned with life as a whole, exerting its jurisdiction, not in limited, but in 
global terms. In a society like this, the mere idea of a separation of the Church 
and the State is devoid of sense, in that the Church and the State, religious power 
and political power, do not exist as two distinct units able to be separated; they 
are one (Abdi, 2017, p. 30). 
 
The literature has many studies where we can find various of the idea quoted above. 
However, in brief, the essentialists argue that the reason why Western countries have 
efficient democracies and high level of political freedom is that of the separation of 
church and state. 
 
On the other hand, Islamists also hold similar arguments. For instance, Hasan al-Banna, 
Ebu’l A’lâ el-Mevdudi, Seyyid Qutb, Naquip al-Attas, Yusuf al- Qaradawi and other 
Islamists believe that “Islam is the solution,” and that the Quran, the Sunna or other 
secondary Islamic sources are good enough to provide answers for all the needs of the 
Muslims. If one is to ask these scholars, “What do you think about secularism/laicism” to 
these scholars, perhaps they would generally argue that a) secularism is a Western-
Christian product, b) it is the ideology of dictatorial regimes in the Middle East where has 
been used as a tool of for suppressing Muslims and, c) there is no separation between 
religion and state in Islam. Accordingly, what secularism or separation of state and 
religion means for Islamists is not something that to be supported, and it is not 
appropriate with Islam. For instance, Mawdudi accuses secularism as “atheism,” 
Qaradawi defines it as “irreligious”, and Al-Attas states that secularism does not have 
roots within Islam (Attas, 1978; El-Karadavi, 2013; Nasr, 1996).  
 
It can be provocative to state that cultural essentialists and Islamists have something in 
common. They both argue that Islam does not separate religion and state. While 
essentialists believe in this argument to prize what western civilization achieved because 
of the separation of church and state, Islamists use this argument to make a distinction 
between Islam and Christianity. To Islamists, Islam should be materialized in state affairs 
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because Islam is the solution to everything. However, for cultural essentialists, Islam 
prevents Muslims to adopt western concepts and political systems.  
 
1.2. An Alternative View: Raziq’s Contribution to the Debate  
Before discussing Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s arguments, it should be stated that his contribution 
has been significant. Indeed, he re-opened a door to look at the debates with the eyes 
of the modern age. Whether his approach is called as “Secular-Liberal” approach (Abdi, 
2017), or “Islamic Laicism” (Radhan, 2014) or “Muslim secularism” (Pankhurst, 2010), he 
had only one goal: Islam does not suggest an ideal political system. In 1925, he published 
a very controversial book, called Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundation of 
Political Power), in which he argues that since Islam does not specify a political system 
for Muslims, and the caliphate was a historical concept that is not a mandatory in Islam. 
He, then, questions the whole political authority during the Prophet and argues that the 
Prophet’s mission is only spiritual, and he was not a political leader. With such 
arguments, Raziq eventually justifies the separation of Islam and state. He simply argues 
that states or political authorities harmed religion, and historically, Islam had become a 
tool for political ambitions by caliphs/kings/sultans. According to Raziq, politics, state, 
power are all the topics of the world, which Prophet had no interest in them. Raziq did 
not use the word “secularism” or “laicism” even though scholars see him as “Muslim 
Secularist.” He received much criticism for saying that Islam has nothing to say about an 
ideal state or a political system, that the caliphate is not a religious institution. 
 
Today, it is hard to write an article or a book on the political history of the modern Middle 
East without mentioning Raziq and his contributions. Since he studied in the famous 
traditional school al-Azhar University, scholars have always wondered the 
transformation in the thoughts of Raziq. This study aims to present the views of Raziq 
who urges Muslims to think outside the box, in spite of his ambiguous arguments and 
assertive language.  
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1.3. Methodology and Resources 
There has been considerable literature on how Raziq challenged the existing traditional 
views and how he opened a door for new interpretations to re-think about politics, state, 
regimes and state-religion affairs. In this thesis, I examine a scholar whose political ideas 
has seen as controversial in the modern history of Muslim political thought. I hope that 
this study may contribute to the literature on the history of ideas. In this study, I utilize 
a qualitative method, more specifically textual analysis. I critically evaluate the texts that 
have been written by and on Ali Abd ul-Raziq, and I also compare the existing information 
about Raziq to test their reliability. Because the topic is historical, almost all the 
references are from the academic books and journals.  
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to show how Raziq differs from the mainstream scholars. 
To demonstrate that, I use a comparative approach, and I try to compare Raziq's views 
with the views of the Sunni Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Mawardi, and Ibn 
Khaldun. I was able to read the primary texts of the three scholars that were translated 
into either English or Turkish. I will rely on the Turkish translation of Ibn Taymiyyah's es-
Siyasetü’ş-şeriyye translated by Dergah Yayınları, the English translation of al-Mawardi’s 
Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah (The Ordinance of Government) translated by Ta-Ha Publisher 
and the English translation of Ibn Khaldun’s The Muhaddimah by Princeton University. 
Moreover, I also looked at secondary sources that were written on the medieval Islamic 
political thought such as Ann Lambton’s State and Government in Medieval Islam and 
Erwin Rosenthal’s Political Thought in Medieval Islam as well as Patrica Crone’s Medieval 
Islamic Political Thought. Because the focus of this thesis is not the medieval scholars’ 
interpretations, I will briefly explain what these scholars wrote on the topics that Raziq 
discussed. More specifically, I tried to focus on Raziq’s contribution to the debates. 
 
In fact, this thesis has several limitations. Since I do not know Arabic, I relied on the 
English and Turkish translations of Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm and the literature in the 
two languages. In this project, Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s books, discussions of the scholars on 
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Raziq and his arguments will be the main source for this thesis. Indeed, the language 
barrier restricts me from engaging with some Arabic texts, but I believe that I have 
reached most of the secondary sources in Turkish and English that provide information 
about the Arabic texts. Some of the articles that I used in this research are from either 
Arab scholars or western scholars who know the Arabic language. For instance, several 
western scholars examine various Arabic books that discuss Raziq’s arguments, Arabic 
thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939 and Islamic liberalism: a critique of development 
ideologies (Binder, 1988; Hourani, 1983). These books help us to see how Arabic scholars 
react to Raziq’s arguments. Of course, it would be an excellent opportunity to spend 
several months in the libraries of Egypt to evaluate Raziq’s opinion pieces in al-Siyasa 
magazine, but I hope to do that in my future studies.  
 
1.4. Some notes on al-Islam wa- Usul al- Ḥukm 
The name of Ali Abd ul-Raziq is stated, in one way or another, in the literature of Islam 
and politics. It is noted that a good body of research on Raziq has been written in the 
Arabic language (Ali, 2009, p. 10). Although Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm was published in 
1925 in Cairo, the full translation of the book into English is quite recent. Edinburgh 
University Press translated it into English in 2012 as “Islam and the Foundation of Political 
Power.” Previously, the book was translated into French in 1994, and Abdou Filali-Ansary 
has prepared both English and French editions. Before Filali-Ansary, Raziq’s book was not 
fully translated into English. There were partly translations of the essays in the book by 
several scholars such as Contemporary debates in Islam, Islam in transition and Liberal 
Islam (Donohue & Esposito, 2007; Kurzman, 1998; Moaddel & Talattof, 2000). Moreover, 
Raziq’s book was translated into several other languages such as Spanish, Italian, 
German, Malay, and Indonesian (Radhan, 2014, p. 12) as well as Turkish by Birlesik Press 
in 1995 (Abdurrazık, 1995). 
 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq divides al-Islam wa- Usul al- Ḥukm (Islam and the Foundations of Political 
Power) into three sections. In the first section, he examines the concept of the caliphate. 
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In this chapter, he defines his understating of “caliphate,” and shows the opinions of the 
early scholars about the concept of the caliphate. In the second section, he examines the 
nature of Prophetic authority and discusses the structure of Prophet’s state. He asks 
several bold questions on the first page of the chapter, such as did the Prophet form a 
state, did the Prophet Mohammad appoint judges, was the Prophet a king? In the third 
chapter, to support and justify his ideas about the caliphate and the nature of Prophetic 
authority in Islam, he gives some historical examples of how the institution of caliphate 
was used across centuries. In this chapter, Raziq questions the religious authority of the 
first Caliph Abu Bakr. 
 
Although chapters are approximately twenty pages long, the information Raziq tries to 
give is overwhelming. Some information can also be found in another section of the 
book. For instance, chapter one deals with the caliphate as a theoretical concept it also 
had historical information about the caliphs which Raziq also highlights once again in the 
third chapter.  However, Raziq provides keywords and questions that he tries to answer 
on the top of all sections, which helps the reader to see what to expect.  
 
The second edition if the book was not until Raziq’s death in 1966, it was republished in 
Beirut with a critique of the book by Mamduh Haqqi. In 1988, Muhammad Amarah 
published the full text of the book, which combined the studies done on Raziq’s 
arguments. Similarly, Wajih al-Kawtharani’s compilation in 1996 consists of Raziq’s book. 
Finally, several other editions were published between 1993 and 2005 in Cairo and Beirut 
(Radhan, 2014, p. 11).   
 
1.5. Review of Literature on Ali Abd ul-Raziq 
The name of Ali Abd ul-Raziq in one way or another stated in the literature of Islam and 
politics. It is noted that a good body of research on Raziq has been written in Arabic (Ali, 
2009, s. 10). Although Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm was published in 1925 in Cairo, the 
translation of the book into English is quite recent. Edinburgh University Press translated 
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it in 2012 as “Islam and the Foundation of Political Power.” Previously, the book was 
translated into French in 1994, and Abdou Filali-Ansary has prepared both English and 
French editions. Before Filali-Ansary, Raziq’s book was not fully translated into English. 
There were partly translations of the essays in the book by several scholars such as 
Contemporary debates in Islam, Islam in transition and Liberal Islam (Donohue & 
Esposito, 2007; Kurzman, 1998; Moaddel & Talattof, 2000). Moreover, Raziq’s book was 
translated into several other languages such as Spanish, Italian, German, Malay, and 
Indonesian (Radhan, 2014, p. 12) as well as Turkish by Birlesik Press in 1995 (Abdurrazık, 
1995). 
 
I analyze several Arabic books translated into Turkish that examine Raziq’s arguments 
such as İslam'da devlet mefhumu, İslamda siyasi düşünce tarihi and Laiklik ve Dini 
Fanatizm Arasında İslam Devleti (Avva, 2011; El-Karadavi, 2013; Rayyıs, 1995). These 
three scholars criticize Raziq for Raziq’s arguments about religion and state. They believe 
that formation of a Muslim state was in fact a part of the Prophet’s duty. While Avva 
argues that even if Islam does not explicitly propose a political system, it does not mean 
that Islam is only a heavenly religion. However, Rayyis and Qaradawi are critical, even 
scornful, about Raziq. 
 
Other than several books and doctoral thesis, the English literature about Raziq generally 
gives brief information. In other words, his arguments have not been discussed in detail 
in the English literature. Typically, they write only a few sentences about Raziq such as 
Raziq was a classically trained scholar but became a liberal secularist, he was against the 
theory of caliphate, and he believed in the separation of state and Islam. Other than such 
information, Raziq has not been studied much and not known by the non-Arab scholars.  
 
As far as this research is concerned, I have encountered only two books that Raziq is the 
primary focus in English literature. They are Souad T. Ali’s work A Religion, Not a State: 
Ali Abd al-Raziq’s Islamic Justification of Political Secularism and Luay Radhan’s, Muslims 
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against the Islamic state: Arab Critics and Supporters of Ali Abdarraziq's Islamic laicism 
(Ali, 2009; Radhan, 2014). The two books are the Ph.D. theses that Ali and Radhan 
decided to publish. After Raziq’s book, these two books are the ones that I mostly rely 
on. They are not only discussing Raziq’s arguments, but they also historicize and put 
Raziq’s arguments in a historical context and compare it with traditional sources. My 
thesis is a critical evaluation of the Raziq’s book as well as an examination of the thoughts 
and information that the two scholars give in their studies.  
 
By using textual analysis, Souad T. Ali examines how Ali Abd ul-Raziq is different from the 
Sunni Muslim scholars. She analyzes all the arguments of Raziq in each chapter and 
historicizes the context when he wrote the book. It should be stated that this book is not 
an argumentative text, but it should obtain credit for being the first full-organized study 
on Raziq in the English language. Therefore, the book’s name itself shows that Souad Ali 
presents the central argument of Raziq: Islam is a religion, not a state. Ali states that the 
reason why the debate became controversial was that Ali Abd ul-Raziq was the “first 
Azhar-educated scholar with the rank of ‘ālim to declare that Islam is a religion, not a 
state; a message, not a government” (Ali, 2009, p. 4). Moreover, like Souad Ali, Luay 
Radhan also discusses Raziq in the concept of the separation of state and religion. To 
avoid confusion and philosophical discussion about the meaning of “secularism,” Radhan 
uses “laicism” instead. He argues that Raziq was the father of “Islamic laicism” and Raziq 
showed that there could be an Islamic society without an “Islamic state.” Perhaps, his 
main contribution is that he argues that Raziq’s arguments also helped to distinguish 
“Islamic Laicism” and “secular (non-religious) laicism.” He defines both laicism as 
following: “Whereas the Kemalist laicism of Turkey, for example, has had an anti-
religious and dictatorial fundament, the Islamic laicists demand a pro-religious and 
democratic laicism based on a decidedly Islamic argumentation” (Radhan, 2014, p. 5). 
Similarly, another full study on Ali Abd ul-Raziq is a doctoral dissertation by James 
Broucek from the Florida State University. In his Ph.D. thesis, “The Controversy of Shaykh 
Ali ‘Abd Al-Raziq,” he tries to answer the question: why did Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s work not 
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receive support from his contemporaries (Broucek, 2012)? By applying Eric Hobsbawm’s 
“tradition is invented,” he states that it was not because Ali Abd ul-Raziq was too 
unorthodox but because of the invented traditions of the past. Broucek argues that “new 
political theories like ‘Abd al-Raziq’s, often call for members of a community to reimagine 
their collective identity. Oftentimes, however, this new identity is presented not as a new 
form of community, but as an old one—the traditional, or original form of community. 
Innovators create revisionist origins stories of the community, which project newly-
imagined forms of community into the past” (Broucek, 2012, p. 10). 
 
Several scholars discuss Raziq while discussing more broad topics. Charles C. Adams, 
Islam and Modernism in Egypt and Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1789-1939 discuss Raziq in the context of Muhammed Abduh. They both discuss whether 
Abduh’s ideas influenced Raziq or not. Adams shows that Raziq was one of the Egyptian 
intellectuals who was affected by Muhammed Abduh. He locates Raziq as “The position 
of Ali Abd al-Raziq belongs somewhere between that of his brother Mustafa and that of 
Taha Husain. Not so radical as the latter nor so skeptical in matters of religion” (Adams, 
1968, s. 259). Hourani discusses Raziq’s arguments in details and he discusses 
Muhammad Bakhit’s criticisms of Raziq (Hourani, 1983, pp. 183-192). Hourani is mainly 
concerned with how the modern western ideas influenced the Middle East. 
 
Leonard Binder is another scholar who gives a whole chapter to discussing Raziq and his 
arguments. In his book Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, as other 
scholars do, after addressing Raziq’s main views, he compares several studies on Raziq, 
which are mainly studies of Hourani and Imara. In the final section, he argues that Raziq 
influenced rationalists and liberal scholars such as Muhammed Arkoun. (Binder, 1988). 
 
Erwin J. Rosenthal gives half of the chapter to the discussion of Raziq regarding his 
arguments about the concept of the caliphate in his Islam in the Modern National State. 
Rosenthal discusses whether Raziq’s arguments resembles to those of the Turkish 
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sociologist Ziya Gokalp, stating that they are radically different thinkers. For him, Raziq 
was more classically influenced scholar compared to Gokalp. Rosenthal states that Raziq 
whatever the merits or faults of his arguments, he provocatively opposed the idea of 
manipulating Islam for national or nationalist politics (Rosenthal, 2009, pp. 86-87). He 
compares Raziq’s interpretations to those of the medieval scholars such as Ibn Khaldun 
and Mawardi (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 90). Rosenthal also criticizes Raziq for not showing 
credible sources to convince his readers that Prophet did not possess political authority. 
He states that “We must accept that Ali Abd al Raziq is in dilemma. By a sincere, devout 
faith in the truth enshrined in the Quran and Sunna, he accepts perfection in everything 
the Prophet said and did; by rational inquiry into history, he discovers the gulf that 
separates the rule of religion, represented by Muhammad, from the power-state of the 
caliphs” (Rosenthal, 2009, pp. 95-96).  
 
Antony Black in The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present, 
gives a brief discussion of Raziq. He states that Raziq took a modernist path and argued 
against the Islamic tradition. Black sees Raziq’s arguments as “astute and original,” but 
he also asks: “Was Abd al-Raziq’s interpretation of the Prophet’s mission plausible?” 
(Black, 2011, pp. 331-332). In his Reformation of Islamic Thought, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd 
discusses Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book and argues that Raziq represents the liberal aspects of 
Abduh’s discourse. He also states that while Raziq’s ideas did not find support in the 
Middle East, they are widespread in Indonesia (Abū-Zaid, 2006). Bassam Tibi also 
discusses Raziq in his several studies. In his Arab nationalism: between Islam and the 
nation-state, Tibi states that Raziq established a harmony between Islam and secularism, 
which could be seen as an agenda for Islamic liberalism (Tibi, 1997, p. 227). In this book, 
Tibi discusses al-Husri’s arguments, which he thinks was influenced by Raziq (Tibi, 1997, 
pp. 170-177). 
 
Hamid Enayat states that Raziq was the most controversial figure in the debates 
regarding the caliphate. After explaining Raziq’s main arguments, he articulates that “It 
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is possible that if the essential ideas of the book had not been dressed in such a 
provocative language, they would have been received differently by the orthodox 
establishment ...” (ʿInāyat, 1991, s. 65). He states that because of the violent reactions 
of the orthodox Muslims, Raziq did not develop his ideas and could not reach more 
explosive conclusions (ʿInāyat, 1991, s. 68). Mona Hassan deals with the history of the 
caliphate, but she also gives pages to discuss Raziq’s arguments regarding the caliphate 
(Hassan, 2016, s. 225). She argues that Raziq was influenced by Turkish Justice Minister 
Seyyid Bey’s speech during abolition of caliphate she argues that “In drawing clear lines 
between himself as the author and “them,” ʾAbd al- Rāziq positions himself as a 
European-inspired enlightened intellectual above and beyond the discursive tradition of 
Muslim jurists” (Hassan, 2016, s. 227). 
 
There are several articles on Raziq and his arguments. Overall, they discussed him in 
similar contexts such as his family, his party engagement, studies and so on. Meir Hatina 
gives information about Raziq in discussions of state-religion transformation in Egypt 
(Hatina, 2000). Majid Fakhry, Fehmi Jadaane and Reza Pankhurst compare Raziq and 
several other Muslim scholars’ views about the concept of “Islamic state.” They devote 
a couple of pages to Raziq’s arguments (Fakhry, 1954; Jadaane, 1985; Pankhurst, 2010). 
Fakhry believes that Raziq’s work was the “most thoughtful and constructive attempt” 
that challenges the traditional view of “Islamic state” (Fakhry, 1954, s. 456). Fehmi 
Jadaane argues that Raziq thought that his inquiry was a “great service” to Islam but in 
fact, his ideas “did not evoke any positive responses among learned men of religion and 
religious law” (Jadaane, 1985, s. 34). Similarly, Pankhurst discusses Raziq in the sub-
chapter of “Muslim Secularist” as the pioneer of “Muslim secularism” trend (Pankhurst, 
2010, p. 833). 
 
In Turkish literature, Raziq has been studied by several scholars such as Mehmet Görmez, 
Mehmet Azimli and Talip Türcan (Azimli, 2002; Görmez, 1995; Türcan, 2005). It should 
be stated that the Turkish articles on Raziq are somehow similar. Görmez, Azimli, and 
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Turcan start to give background about Raziq then discuss the book as a whole. While 
Gormez examines Raziq in the context of secularism, Azimli and Turcan focus on his 
arguments about the concept of the caliphate. Görmez sees Raziq as “the person who 
starts the discussion of secularism in the Islamic world.” To my knowledge, Görmez’s 
article is one of the first publication on Raziq in the Turkish language in addition to the 
translation of the book. Azimli argues that the book is written more journalistic style 
rather than academic, and “the major problem of the book is its apprehensibility” (Azimli, 
2001, p. 62). Erroneously, Türcan made an enormous mistake with the date of birth and 
death years. He states that Raziq lived between 1883—1967. However, the truth is Raziq 
was born in 1888 and died in 1966. Overall, the three scholars rightly state that the 
biggest problem of Raziq is his ambiguous argument about the nature of the authority of 
the Prophet Mohammed. 
 
1.6. Organization of the Thesis 
This study consists of five chapters. After this introductory chapter, I explain the 
historical context that shaped Raziq’s views of the caliphate and political system during 
the Prophet Muhammad. The political context of Egypt and the discussions about the 
separation and abolition of the sultanate and caliphate among Ottoman elites is 
important for understanding Raziq’s ideas. In the chapter, I also give a short personal 
story of Raziq. 
 
In the third chapter, I discuss one of the central arguments of Raziq: The concept of the 
caliphate. I explain how Raziq differs from the orthodox interpretation of the caliphate. 
I utilize a comparative perspective and compare Raziq’s views with medieval scholars. In 
this chapter, I explain how the caliphate became the first controversial topic among 
Muslims, how al-Ghazali, Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Khaldun and many others viewed 
the concept of the caliphate. More importantly, I examine how Raziq challenges the 
classic theory of the caliphate.  
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In the fourth chapter, I examine Raziq’s second and the most controversial argument: 
political authority in Islam and the Islamic state. Like the previous chapter, I first discuss 
how political authority, Islamic state, and power generally seen in the mainstream views, 
namely Muslims scholars, Islamists, and orientalists. By applying a comparative method, 
I show how and where Raziq differs and perhaps challenges the existing views. 
 
In the conclusion part, I summarize Raziq’s main points and discuss whether the 
criticisms against him are reliable or not. I show that while this discussion happened a 
century ago, the topics that Raziq discussed are still hot topics among scholars. As the 
literature that I used in this thesis show, in fact, the first full English translation is done 
only recently. And many doctoral level theses were written on Raziq in the last decades. 
It is reasonable to think that the reason why Raziq’s arguments are increasingly being 
reviewed is that because of the transformation and new developments within political 
Islam movements and the politics of Muslims in the world. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RAZIQ’S ARGUMENTS 
  
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I give a historical background regarding Ali Abd ul-Raziq and the political 
situation of the time when he published his book, al Islam wa Usul al-Hukm. First, I argue 
that Raziq’s personal experience helps to understand his ideas such as his study in Azhar 
while Muhammad Abduh was a scholar and taking courses from orientalists in Egyptian 
university, his short experience in the United Kingdom, and being a member of a notable 
liberal family. Without one aspect of his personal story, Raziq’s arguments cannot be 
contextualized. Second, I briefly explain how Ottoman elites justified the abolition of the 
caliphate and what kind of debates took place among Turkish and Egyptian intellectuals 
in the 1920s. I believe that without understanding the historical circumstances of the 
1920s when Ali Abd ul-Raziq came to the scene, it would be challenging to navigate 
Raziq's arguments. This chapter aims to contextualize Raziq’s main arguments for helping 
readers to understand the next chapters. Therefore, I provide a short historical context 
of the debates and developments regarding the abolition of sultanate and caliphate in 
newborn Turkey and Egypt. 
 
 While the eradication of the caliphate opened a new gate for some Muslim scholars like 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq to think about new concepts and systems, not all people were willing to 
accept it. In Turkey, Egypt, India and many other places people reacted to the abolition 
of the caliphate. I argued that the debates over the removal of the caliphate in Turkey 
and Egypt had affected Raziq to come up with a controversial book. He was affected by 
the arguments such as “caliphate cannot be separated with sultanate” or “the caliphate 
is a religiously necessary institution.” For instance, Raziq shows that he was aware of the 
debates took place in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), more specifically he 
gives reference to Justice Minister Seyyid Bey's speech that favored abolition of caliphate 
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in the Assembly. Therefore, before discussing Raziq’s case, I give a brief political context 
of debates that Ottoman elites held about the abolition in Egypt and Turkey. Following 
the discussion about abolition in Turkey and Egypt affected Raziq to write his book. 
 
2.2. A Synopsis about Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s Life  
Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) came from an elite Egyptian family. His father Hasan Abd 
ul-Raziq was a large farm-owner and was, in 1907, among the founders of the Umma 
Party (People’s Party). His brother Hasan was the governor of Alexandria, and another 
brother Mustafa was a well-known philosopher who was a student of Muhammad 
Abduh–the pioneer of modernist Islam–in Azhar where Mustafa later became the rector 
in 1945 (Hourani, 1983, p. 163). Another brother Mahmud was a co-founder of the 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party (LCP). 
 
Like his brother Mustafa, Ali Abd ul-Raziq was a classically trained Islamic scholar. From 
age 10 to 23, he studied in Azhar where Abduh was an Islamic scholar, and Raziq was 
graduated with the title of shaikh (Sagiv, 1995, p. 25). As Charles Adams states, Raziq had 
the opportunity to be a student of Abduh for a short time as well as a student of Shaikh 
Ahmad Abu Khatwah who was a friend of Abduh and another student of al-Afghani 
(Adams, 1968). After completing his studies in el-Azhar, Raziq attended the newly 
founded Egyptian (Cairo) University (EU) which was the center for western-style studies 
(Reid, 1990). 
 
Scholars argue that besides Abduh, Raziq was also influenced by his western professors 
like Carlo Alfonso Nallino and Santillana (Broucek, 2012; ʿInāyat, 1991). While his 
professors in the Egyptian University may have influenced him, scholars argued that Ali 
Abd al-Raziq was affected more by the first modernist Islamists Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani 
and Muhammad Abduh (Abū-Zaid, 2006; Adams, 1968; Ali, 2009; Black, 2011; Fakhry, 
2004; Hatina, 2000; Hourani, 1983; ʿ Ināyat, 1991). For instance, Hamid Enayat states that 
“his writings did not indicate much absorption of Western thought - this, in fact, was his 
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strong point in so far as his ideas were meant to influence moderate religious opinion” 
(Enayat, 1982, p. 62). Hourani also believes that “the direct influence of English thought 
is not great, and once more we are in the climate of thought created by Abduh” on Raziq 
(Hourani, 1983, p. 183). Scholars see Raziq’s experiences in the Egyptian University 
where several orientalists such as Nallino taught important factor for explaining Raziq’s 
arguments (Broucek, 2012, pp. 163–169; Hassan, 2016, p. 225). A similar argument can 
also be found in Jankowski and Gershoni’s book: “Ali Abd al-Raziq's book was a drastic 
and dramatic manifestation of the Western-oriented modernism that flourished in Egypt 
in the 1920s” (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 61). Broucek argues that Raziq took the 
course of the history of Arabic literature given by Nallino in Egyptian University and Raziq 
applied the historical methodology that he learned in this course to his book (Broucek, 
2012, p. 164). He states: 
 
Historians like Francois Guizot or Carlo Nallino believed they could study the past 
to discover laws of culture, sociology, economics, or politics that could guide the 
progress of nations into the future. Arab historians, on the other hand, were 
primarily interested in amassing and authenticating all surviving accounts of the 
past. According to Nallino, even the best Arab historians have “confined 
themselves to detailing the memory of events and occurrences year by year, 
without research into [their] causes, social circumstances, the connection 
between events, their effects, and without extending their aim to anything more 
than a genuine memory of the apparent contingencies that befall the nation.” 
Arab historians were more interested in transmitting reports exactly as they had 
received them, then combining these reports into an argumentative narrative. 
Nallino’s observations about the deficiencies of Arab history reveal the virtues of 
European historical research that he intended to pass on to his students 
(Broucek, 2012, p. 166). 
 
Hassan also argues: 
 
Following the critical historical methodology impressed upon him and others of 
his generation as a service to their nation by a rousing Nallino, Abdul Rāziq began 
considering the history of the Islamic judiciary and by extension that of Islamic 
governance and the caliphate from which it derived its legitimacy. This 
intellectual side project occupied him off and on over the years that he served as 
a judge (Hassan, 2016, p. 225). 
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After his studies, Raziq started to teach history courses at Azhar for a while. In 1912, he 
went to England to study political science and economics at Oxford University, but due 
to the eruption of the World War I, he returned to Egypt in 1915 and he was only able to 
study the English language during his stay in England (Broucek, 2012). When he returned, 
he was ratified by Azhar to be a shari’a court judge in the city of Mansoura, and he taught 
Islamic law at the Islamic Institute of Alexandria (Sagiv, 1995, p. 25). According to Azimli, 
Raziq had a chance to read and think about Islamic law and history during his duty as a 
judge (Azimli, 2001).  
 
Raziq was active in politics like his father and brothers. For instance, his brother Mahmud 
and he supported–and funded–the establishment of the LCP in 1922 (Hassan, 2016, p. 
225). He even ran for a seat in the parliamentary election of 1923–1924 (Hatina, 2000). 
Raziq and his liberal associates were against the increasingly authoritarian attitude of 
King Fuad and Zaghlul in 1924. With the independence, political parties like LCP wanted 
to take part in the government as Wafd Party. 
 
Meanwhile, the institution of the caliphate was abolished in 1924, which perceived as a 
“horror” for orthodox Muslims (Hourani, 1983, p. 184). Many scholars were discussing 
the future of Muslims without caliph, and they were deeply concerned about the future. 
However, the abolition could also be seen as an opportunity as it opened gates to Muslim 
states for new approaches to international relations and rethinking about new political 
concepts for Muslims (Black, 2011, p. 298). In fact, it was what Raziq also believed, 
meaning that the institution of the caliphate was now gone, and Muslims had to think 
about the new political system for themselves. Hourani states, “there was a lively 
discussion throughout the Muslim world about whether the Turkish action was 
legitimate and whether the caliphate could or should be revived” (Hourani, 1983, p. 183) 
and so do Egyptian Azharite scholars. 
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Raziq believed that Azharite scholars sought to elect King Fouad as the new caliph in the 
forthcoming Cairo conference on 13-19 May 1926. To counter a potential decision of 
Azharite scholars for suggesting King Fouad as new caliph, Ali Abd ul-Raziq published his 
groundbreaking book in April 1925. In this book, Raziq attacked traditionalist and their 
ambition to choose King Fuad as caliph (Binder, 1988, p. 130; Gershoni & Jankowski, 
1986, p. 62). He believed that Muslims should look for new systems; perhaps he 
suggested that Muslims should adopt democracy or constitutional monarchy and should 
undoubtedly close the chapter of the caliphate. He thought that King Fouad was already 
powerful, and with the title of the caliphate, he would become much more powerful and 
authoritarian, which the King may even shut down the political parties and Assembly.  
 
Briefly, Raziq claimed that the concept of the caliphate had no basis either in the Quran 
or the Sunna, and there has never been a consensus (ijma) in the history of the caliphate. 
Raziq argued that no political system could be labeled as “Islamic.” According to him, 
religious authority and political authority are different and separated in Islam, and the 
Prophet Muhammad was only a spiritual leader. Hourani argues that Raziq opened the 
doors for asking two fundamental questions: Is the caliphate a religiously necessary 
institution, and is there such a thing as an Islamic system of government? (Hourani, 1983, 
p. 184). As Muhammed Imara states, “no other book has caused such controversy, 
disrupt and aggression since the invention of the printed press” (In Azimli, 2001, p. 57). 
 
Raziq’s arguments became the main subjects of the Egyptian media, and his case created 
a massive political crisis in Egypt, which Hassan depicted it as a “storm” (Hassan, 2016, 
p. 232).  They could not believe the fact that how an Azharite scholar holds such ‘heretic’ 
views. The traditionalists severely criticized Raziq. For instance, Rashid Rida argued in 
Egyptian nationalist newspapers and al-Manar journal that Raziq’s book can be used by 
the enemies of Islam (Ali, 2009; Sagiv, 1995, p. 28). After several months, the Azharite 
scholars were still debating Raziq’s book and tried to refute his claims. For instance, 
scholars like Muḥammad Bakhit al- Muṭiʾi and Yusuf al- Dijwi published over six hundred 
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more pages to refute Raziq’s arguments (Hassan, 2016, p. 230). Perhaps, one reason why 
they criticized him was that Raziq’s title and vocation as a sharia judge. As Hamid Inayat 
states “all this was somewhat paradoxical” to traditionalists (Enayat, 1982, p. 62). In 
other words, it would not be a problem if the bold claims were coming from a secular 
nationalist Egyptian scholar. 
 
During the 1930s, it is argued that the over 25 books were written to refute Raziq’s 
arguments (Azimli, 2001, p. 66). In the June of 1925, the head of the Azhar, Muhammad 
Abu’l- Fadl al- Jizawi, received letters from scholars to act against Raziq. For instance, 
sixty-three religious scholars published an open letter demanding Shaykh al- Azhar Jizawi 
to defend Islam against Raziq’s “atheistic” claims (Hassan, 2016, p. 228). These scholars 
reminded the article 101 of law that passed in 1911. According to the law, the 
responsibility of Azhar was “to protect religion and convey beneficial knowledge, to 
support and defend that beneficial knowledge within all possible legal means, to spread 
sacred, clement guidance among Muslims, to encourage public benefit and discourage 
general harm, to oppose heterodoxy, clarify misconceptions, and counter poor morals 
and behavior” (Hassan, 2016, p. 228).  
 
The calls for taking action against Raziq was successful, and the Azhar’s High Council of 
Ulama Council (AHCUC) (Hayʿat Kibār al- ʾUlamāʿ) met to discuss Raziq’s arguments in 
July 1925. Eventually, they found Raziq’s arguments as unacceptable and listed seven 
charges were stated against him:  
 
1. He [Ali Abdul Raziq] makes the Islamic shari‘a a purely spiritual law, with no 
connection to the administration of justice [al-hukm] and the legal execution [al-
tanfiḏ] of worldly affairs. 
2. And [he alleges] that the religion [of Islam] allows that the Prophet’s war 
efforts were [performed] on behalf of the monarchy [al-mulk], and not on behalf 
of religion, nor for the transmission of God’s word [al-da‘wa] to the territories. 
3. And [he alleges] that the system of government administration [al-hukm] in 
the age of the Prophet was a vague, obscure, disorganized, and deficient subject 
that necessitates confusion. 
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4. And [he alleges] that the Prophet’s mission was to convey the shari‘a, apart 
from justice and administration [al-tanfiḏ]. 
5. And [he] doubts the consensus of the Companions concerning the necessity of 
establishing the caliphate. 
6. And [he] doubts that the judicial office is an office of the shari‘a. 
7. And [he alleges] that the government of Abu Bakr, and the Rightly-Guided 
Caliphs after him, was not religious (Broucek, 2012, p. 8). 
 
After these seven charges, the council decided to expel Raziq’s ‘alim’ or ‘shaykh’ title, to 
dismiss him from his sharia court judge duty. The rector of al-Azhar, Jizawi read the 
Council’s decision: 
 
We, the Shaykhs of al-Azhar University, with the consensus of the twenty-four 
ulama among us from the High Council of ‘Ulama, have ruled to dismiss Ali Abd 
al-Raziq—one of the ‘ulama of al-Azhar University, judge of the Mansura Shari‘a 
Court of First Instance, and author of the book Islam and the Foundations of 
Government—from the corps of ulama (Broucek, 2012, p. 8).  
 
Although the council decided to dismiss Raziq as judge and to expel his title of alim in 
17th of August 1925, the committee had to wait for the approval of the justice ministry 
until 12 September in 1925. Within a month, Egypt faced a severe political crisis because 
of the Azharite scholars’ decision. The acting prime minister was royalist Ittihadist Yaḥya 
Ibrahim Pasha, and the justice minister was the chairperson of LCP, Abd ul-Aziz Fahmi. 
While Fahmi did not want to approve the document against Raziq, Ibrahim Pasha try to 
force him to approve Raziq’s dismissal (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 63). Fahmi 
believed that Raziq used his freedom of speech right, and he would resign instead of 
signing the document (Hassan, 2016, p. 231).  
 
The King was provoked with Raziq’s arguments and a dissolution of the coalition of the 
two parties, Ittihad, and Liberal constitutionalist would help him to expel the 
independent interior minister Ismaʾil Ṣidqi Pasha to obtain full control of the next 
elections (Hassan, 2016, p. 231). The British high commissioner, however, wanted to 
preserve the coalition because of the fear of Wafd to return to power in the upcoming 
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election. Raziq’s book caused the dissolution of the cabinet, and the King Fuad approved 
a new assembly that composed entirely of royalist Ittihadists. Eventually, Azhar’s 
demand for dismissal was accepted on September 17, 1925. Raziq lost his job, a 
prestigious title, and a diploma as a result.  
 
Because of the prosecution in 1925, Raziq decided to go to England again to continue his 
study, but this time he studied law instead of political science and economy. When he 
returned to Egypt, he worked as an attorney for a while. When his brother Mustafa 
became the Sheikh of Azhar in 1945, he helped Raziq to be part of the Egyptian public 
life. He received the title of “pasha” and taught Islamic law for 20 years at EU (Radhan, 
2014, p. 16). In 1947, Raziq published “al-ijma fi al-shari’ah al-Islamiyah” (Consensus in 
the Islamic Law). Radhan states Raziq “became the member of the Egyptian secretary of 
endowments from 1948 to 1949 (Radhan, 2014, p. 17). Raziq also became a member of 
parliament and even the minister of religious affairs. During his ministry, Azharite 
scholars decided to give Raziq’s alim title back. Some argue that Raziq changed his views 
by the end of his life, but Radhan states there is no evidence (Radhan, 2014, p. 17). Ali 
Abd ul-Raziq died on September 23, 1966. 
 
Today, Raziq’s name—at least once—stated in books written on the history of ideas, 
Islam and politics or modernization in the Middle East. In fact, the abolition of the 
caliphate, establishment of modern nation-states in Muslim majority lands forced 
Muslims to re-think about governance and political system. Raziq’s book, therefore, 
opened an alternative gate, which caused the enrichment of the literature about state-
religion relation in Islam. 
 
2.3. Debates over the Separation of Sultanate and Caliphate 
It is crucial to know the political background of the 1920s when analyzing Ali Abd ul-
Raziq’s arguments. He cannot be understood without knowing the theoretical debates 
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in the 1920s about the abolition of the caliphate in Turkish Assembly and Egyptian media 
and the general political context of the new countries.  
 
Regarding the political context, by the 1920s, Turkish and Egyptian nationalists tried to 
weaken the Ottoman sultans and imperialists powers. While the Turkish national 
movement became an elite movement gradually after the independence wars, Egyptian 
one became remarkably popular among ordinary people against British (Hourani, 1983, 
p. 209). In 1919, Egyptians revolted for their independence but failed against the British. 
However, only three years later, British unilaterally issued a declaration of independence 
for Egypt. Nevertheless, it was not real independence because the British still had the 
control of Egypt through various channels. 
 
In Egypt, Fouad—the Rector of Egyptian University—became the King of Egypt after his 
elder brother died in 1917. While British favored Fouad, it also allowed political parties 
to organize election and form governments. British did not want to give all the political 
power to King Fouad to be able to prevent a future political crisis. The Wafd Party was 
formed during the independence revolutions, and its leader Saad Zaghlul was the most 
popular figure among Egyptians. However, British authority did not favor Zaghlul’s Wafd 
Party because of its nationalist leadership. Meanwhile, in October 1922, a group of 
people left Wafd to establish another political party, titled “Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party.” It should be noted that the LCP was not popular among Egyptians when 
considering the popularity of the WP and his leader Saad Zaglul. As a result, Wafd won 
the first election to form a government in January 1924. Since the new constitution of 
Egypt gave the legitimacy to the King to dismiss parliament whenever it was necessary, 
British accepted Zaghlul’s government. Nevertheless, Zaghlul stayed in the office until 
October 1924. King Fuad permitted a royalist Ahmad Ziwar who was a member of Wafd 
Party to be acting prime minister until upcoming election. After the assassination of 
British commissioner, British did not send a new person until in October 1925. King Fuad 
had the full control of Egypt. Acting Prime Minister Ziwar also took four months off for a 
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holiday (Reid, 1990, p. 79). As a result, the political arena was empty, and it was left to 
King Fuad and his royalists. 
 
In Turkey, the independence wars brought its consequences. The new elites in Ankara 
did not aim to restore the authority of the Ottoman dynasty. As Hanioglu states, “The 
nationalist victory of 1922 rendered Ottoman ideology meaningless” (Hanioglu, 2013, p. 
133). Like Hanioglu, Faroz Ahmad suggests that this victory opened a new beginning for 
nationalists, meaning that they had to decide how to form a new regime (Ahmad, 1993). 
TGNA at Ankara wanted to base the new order on the sovereignty of the people, not on 
the royal family. The first step toward the idea of ‘sovereignty of people’ was to abolish 
the sultanate.  
 
2.3.1. Abolition of Sultanate  
While Mustafa Kemal wanted to put an end to Ottoman sultanate and establish a new 
order based on the sovereignty of people, some of his associates such as Rauf Orbay and 
Refet Bele were against the abolition of the sultanate. For instance, in July 1922, 
according to Lewis, Rauf Orbay said: 
 
I am bound by conscience and sentiment to the Sultanate and Caliphate. It is my 
duty to remain loyal to the sovereign: my attachment to the Caliphate is imposed 
on me by my education. Besides this, I would make a general observation. It is 
hard for us to control the general situation. This can only be secured by an 
authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably high. Such is 
the office of Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and to try and set up 
an entity of a different character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster. It 
is quite inadmissible (Lewis, 2002, p. 257). 
 
While the Kemalist elite wanted to eradicate the sultanate, it was not the first aim of the 
Turkish people. For instance, during the independence wars, Islamic identity and saving 
the institution of the caliphate were two main factors for people to side with the national 
movement and resisted imperial powers (Hanioglu, 2013, p. 135). The separation would 
be a critical move for Ankara. To many people, the abolition of sultanate is not only about 
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giving the sovereign rights to people but also endangering the institution of the 
caliphate. It would be easier for Ankara to abolish sultanate, Sukru Hanioglu argues, if 
there were not the idea of the inseparability of caliphate and sultanate: 
 
Despite the original fusion of religion and politics in the early Islamic state, such 
a separation would not have been problematic a few centuries later, when the 
caliphate and sultanate were typically quite distinct institutions. Indeed al-
Mawardi (d.1058) in the eleventh century had in effect legitimized such a 
separation, and the ulama in Mamluk Egypt had accepted a similar arrangement. 
Yet the premise of the inseparability of the caliphate and sultanate gradually 
became the mainstream assumption about the relationship between the two 
institutions. The Ottoman tradition expanded on this point in later years to justify 
the Ottoman sultan’s possession of both titles. Hence, members of the ulama in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, who had vehemently defended this point 
of view, spoke out against the proposed separation (Hanioglu, 2013, p. 137). 
 
When the proposal of the abolition of sultanate came to the Assembly, some members 
stated their theoretical concerns about the status of caliphate in case of the removal of 
the sultanate. For instance, Mustafa Kemal’s associate, Refet Bele, believed that there 
was no alternative regime type other than constitutional monarchy (Ahmad, 1993, p. 52; 
Lewis, 2002, p. 257). Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal was determined to change the regime 
despite all kinds of legal and theological objections in the Assembly.  
 
Because of some theoretical discussion in the Assembly regarding the inseparability of 
sultanate and caliphate, Mustafa Kemal decided to give a speech in the Assembly. He 
said:  
 
Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because 
scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion or debate. 
Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power, and by force. It was 
by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the 
Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the 
Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively 
taken sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. 
The question under discussion is not whether or not we should leave Sultanate 
and sovereignty to the nation. That is already an accomplished fact––the 
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question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If 
those gathered here, the Assembly, and everyone else could look at this question 
in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still 
find expression, but some heads may roll in the process (Lewis, 2002, p. 258). 
 
After the speech, those who were against the abolition of sultanate like Mustafa Efendi 
(Lewis, 2002, p. 258), pardoned and stated that they were discussion issue from more a 
theoretical perspective, but they were “enlightened” by Mustafa Kemal’s explanation 
(Hanioglu, 2013, p. 137). In November 1922, the Turkish Assembly passed the resolution, 
and as a result, the sultanate was abolished, and the institution of the caliphate no longer 
belonged to the Ottoman house. The Assembly gave the sovereign right to the people, 
and parliament members would choose a new caliphate for its nation. People like 
Mustafa Efendi was pleased with the idea that the Assembly would elect new caliph 
because they thought that even if sultanate were abolished, the caliph with his spiritual 
power would remain as the head of the state (Ahmad, 1993, p. 52). 
 
2.3.2. Abolition of Caliphate 
Throughout the Islamic history, the caliphate was the main subject of contestation. As 
an essential symbol of Islamic civilization, the caliphate was extensively utilized in the 
nineteenth century when the influence of western imperialism was much felt in Muslim 
majority lands (Karpat, 2002, p. 243). While people believed that the whole aim of the 
national resistance against imperialist powers was to restore the sultan’s authority, but 
they realized that the institution of sultanate is gone, and they were wrong (Ahmad, 
1993, p. 52; Hanioglu, 2013, p. 135).  
 
The theoretical debate about the inseparability of sultanate and caliphate in 1922 
alarmed Kemalist elites, thus they waited for two years to abolish the institution of the 
caliphate that reminded Ottoman past. As Hanioglu argues limiting––if not taking all––
the political power of caliphate and creating non-functional authority would be difficult 
to explain to Muslims who have no idea about a world without a caliph (Hanioglu, 2013). 
For instance, Halit Akmansu, a founding member of the Association for the Defense of 
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the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, criticized the idea of the abolition of the 
caliphate. He argued that the leaders of national movement promised people in Anatolia 
for saving the caliph’s authority and Islamic identity, but after the victory, they forgot 
their promise (Hassan, 2016, p. 161). Esref Edip, a famous Islamist, was criticizing the 
abolition of the sultanate and feared that the caliphate would also be abolished. He 
argued, like others, the sultanate was inseparable with a caliphate. To inform Assembly, 
he even prepared a booklet as titled “Hilafet-i Islamiye ve Büyük Millet Meclisi” (The 
Islamic Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly), and because he wanted to reach as 
many people as he could, he published under the name of Afyon deputy Ismail Şükrü 
Çelikalay (Hanioglu, 2013, p. 148). Edip argued that the caliph is above the Assembly, and 
the Assembly needs approval from the caliph. Since Eşref Edip gave references to Islamic 
sources during the process of abolition, Mustafa Kemal asks Justice Minister Seyyid Bey 
who was an Islamic law (Fiqh) scholar to refute Edip’s arguments to prevent any further 
theological debates. Seyyid Bey gave a speech in the parliament and tried to convince 
deputies for abolishing the institution caliphate (Erdem, 1996). 
 
Seyyid Bey’s speech was published as a treatise and entitled “Caliphate and the 
Sovereignty of the Nation” by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In 1924, this treatise 
was translated into Arabic by Abd-al-Ghani Sunni. Ali Abdul Raziq gives a reference to 
Seyyid Bey’s speech in his book and categorizes him as a supporter of second theory to 
the caliphate, which was the caliph was the representative of people not the God. Briefly, 
Seyyid Bey supported the abolition of the caliphate, and he wanted to legitimize the 
TNGA as a new way of representing people’s interest instead of the preserving the 
institution of the caliphate (Erdem, 1996; Yıldırım, 2004). Black argues that Raziq’s book 
was a defense of the Seyyid Bey and the TGNA (Black, 2011, p. 330). Raziq was aware of 
the discussions in the TGNA and he developed his arguments as a response to the 
discussions. Seyyid Bey argued that the caliphate was not a matter of religious but a 
worldly matter (Kara, 2014). He asked while there were many hadiths for Muslims’ daily 
behaviors, why is there no hadiths on caliphate? He concludes that the God did not 
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suggest a political system on purpose and the God leaved it to people decide. Seyyid Bey 
stated that Quran has two important principles for creating a worldly authority: 
consultation (shura) and obedience to authority. Because Turkish Assembly can 
substitute as shura mechanism, he asked people to obey the authority who wanted to 
abolish caliphate. Seyyid Bey believed that the Assembly would be a new version of 
caliphate since it is a representation of people. In the new circumstances, people will 
choose their own representation no need for caliphate because the new Grand Assembly 
will represent people (Kara, 2014, p.125). 
 
The caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924 despite the opposition of constitutional 
monarchists such as Rauf (Orbay), Refet (Bele), Kazım (Karabekir), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), 
Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez), and Cevad (Çobanlı) and Halit (Akmansu) (Hassan, 2016, p. 158). 
As Hanioglu states “the name of the caliph was now replaced in the Friday prayers by the 
phrase “Government of the Turkish Republic” (Hanioglu, 2013, p. 152). In the words of 
Anthony Black “It was a triumphal moment for secular modernism in the Muslim-
controlled world: the acts of Lenin were hardly less revolutionary” (Black, 2011, p. 298). 
To Lewis, with the abolition of the caliphate “Kemal was making his first open assault on 
the entrenched forces of Islamic orthodoxy” (Lewis, 2002, p. 264). Overall, abolishing 
sultanate and separating religious and political authority were two radical changes for 
Turkish nationalists toward the idea of creating nation-based state and putting an end to 
politics of Ottomanism (Cleveland & Harmancı, 2008, p. 201). Only a year after the 
abolition of the caliphate, Muslims around the world looked for choosing a caliph since 
they believed that caliphate was one of the fundamental tenets of Islam, and Islam would 
lack one of its cornerstones without it. The abolition was criticized all around the Muslim 
World from India to Egypt.  
 
2.4. Attempts to Re-establish Caliphate in Egypt 
Initially, the Turkish revolt in the 1920s against the imperialists was regarded favorably 
in Egypt. Even the abolition of sultanate did not change the support of Egyptians to the 
 28 
 
Turkish national movement (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 56). They were disappointed 
by the development, and the decision was seen as "the most repugnant crime against 
Islam in the history of Islam" (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 56). For instance, Amin al-
Rafi'I, the spokesman of Watani Party, strongly criticized the decision and labeled it as 
“evil decision” (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 56). Egyptian scholars declared that did 
not accept the decision of Turkish assembly, and they recognized the exiled Abd al-Majid 
as caliph. For instance, as Hilal L. Menküç shows, on 10 March 1924, a group of Azharite 
scholars published a letter on el-Ahrâm, and several similar articles published in al-Menâr 
by Amin ar-Rafiî and Rashid Rida criticizing the TGNA and arguing that the decision was 
illegitimate on the eyes of Muslims (Livaoğlu-Menküç, 2017, pp. 115–130).  
 
However, this stance gradually changed, and Egyptian scholar decided to find a way to 
solve this problem. Over time, they realized that the situation of the Caliph in exiled was 
losing his authority among Muslims. It was not realistic to insist on accepting him as the 
Caliph. Many scholars discussed the future of the institution of the caliphate through 
media. They planned to organize an international conference to discuss the future of the 
institution of the caliphate and elect a new caliph whom would be recognized by all 
Muslims in different parts of the world. It was argued that because of the “central 
geographical position,” “preeminent religious institutions” and “considerable degree of 
political independence,” Egypt was the right place for such a conference (Gershoni & 
Jankowski, 1986, p. 57). In fact, the idea of organizing a conference was discussed 
previously among Egyptian scholars in 1923 when Mustafa Kemal declared through the 
press that he was determined to abolish the caliphate. However, with the official 
abolition, this idea reappeared and advocated even more in the Egyptian media 
(Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 57).  
 
As Hassan argues, while initially Liberal Constitutionalist Party was supporting a 
conference under the sponsorship of Egypt, they were not aware of the fact that Azharite 
scholars would suggest King Fuad as a potential caliph (Hassan, 2016, p. 206). News and 
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speculations were spreading about King Fuad’s ambition for being caliph, which made 
liberals to change their position over caliphate conference. As a result, “through their 
major newspapers, turned their pens against the caliphate conference as a mere vehicle 
to further King Fuʿād’s ambitions” (Hassan, 2016, p. 206). Indeed, Azharite scholars 
wanted to organize a Muslim congress by using the name of Shaykh al-Azhar, and this 
idea found support from the Palace (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p. 59). Hassan argues 
“…the Azhar- affiliated caliphate conference committees proliferated throughout the 
country, it became clear that Ḥasan Nashʿat Pasha, with close ties to the palace, was 
actively supporting their formation” (Hassan, 2016, p. 206). 
 
While King Fuad depicted himself as disinterest for being caliph, through royalists like 
Nash’at Pasha, he also supported an international caliphate congress in Egypt (Hassan, 
2016, p. 205). For instance, Nash’at Pasha arranged meetings with scholars in various 
cities (Kedourie, 1963, p. 217). Similarly, a group of scholars discussed the abolition of 
caliphate at the house of an ex-prime minister, Muhammad Said Pasha, and according 
to Kedourie, one of them said: “Why should the caliphate not go to King Fuad? We have 
but to assemble the ulama of Egypt and they will elect him and give him their suffrages, 
and the caliphate will thus come to belong to the King of Egypt” (Kedourie, 1963, p. 215). 
Another indicator how King Fuad supported the conference was, Kedourie argues that 
the Egyptian parliament asked in 1927 to former Minister of Pious Foundations 
Muhammad al-Gharabli Pasha to explain why he gave £2500 to the Rector of al-Azhar 
during 1924. It appeared that the money was spent on the organization of the 
conference (Kedourie, 1963, p. 216). 
 
As an Islamic scholar and a liberal constitutionalist, Ali Abd ul-Raziq published his book 
on April 1 in 1925 in this historical context. In his book, Raziq attacked traditionalist and 
their potential ambition to choose King Fuad as caliph (Binder, 1988, p. 130; Gershoni & 
Jankowski, 1986, p. 62). He feared that some Azharite scholars like Rashid Rida were 
planning to choose King Fuad as the new caliph. As far as the time of the book is 
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concerned, it seems that while the media discussed the possibility of King Fuad as a new 
caliph, Raziq hurried up to put his raw arguments immediately on the paper to counter 
King Fuad’s and Azharite scholars’ ambitions. King Fuad was already powerful, and with 
the title of the caliphate, he would become much more authoritarian and may cease the 
remaining party politics in Egypt. 
 
In his book, Raziq challenged the long-held assumption about the necessity of a caliphate 
in Islam. Enayat states “(Ali Abd ul-Raziq) was certainly the most controversial theorist 
thrown up by the crisis. He took advantage of the abolition of the Caliphate to launch a 
forceful attack on the entire traditional school of Islamic political thought” (Enayat, 1982, 
p. 62). Raziq believed that Shari’a could be changed according to historical circumstances 
(Black, 2011a, p. 331). Raziq was arguing “for a Muslim equivalent of separation between 
church and state…” (Brown, 2000, p. 49). He argued that Islam is purely a religion and 
does not have a specific injunction for temporal governance in the world.  
 
As an inexperienced in party politics, Egypt faced a severe political crisis in its third year 
of the constitutional monarchy because of Raziq’s book. Al Islam wa Usul al-Hukm 
shaken the coalition of Ittihadist and liberals in Egypt. Because Raziq was close to Liberal 
Constitutionalists, British high commissioner warned that any action against Raziq would 
collapse the fragile coalition government of royalist Ittihad Party and Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party, which eventually British un-favored Wafd party would take 
advantage of the political crisis (Hassan, 2016, p. 228). However, the warnings of the 
British did not work. The fragile alliance fell apart due to the political crisis that Raziq’s 
book created. Especially the royalist Ittihad Party to gain more public support from 
Egyptians, it helped and promoted scholars to criticize Raziq––thus Liberal 
Constitutionalists. As a result, only three years after the independence, the Egyptians 
were disappointed by the political instability and King’s increasing censorship. They 
thought that a “liberal age” had started in 1922 and with the formation of the parties; 
they felt that they had reached its political goals. However, it was a miscalculation:  
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That experiment was supposedly to grant Egypt a constitutional form of 
government, to institute representation and political parties, freedom of speech, 
the right to the opposition – that is, all the trappings of a modern, democratic, 
representative government that operated in favor of the majority and not of a 
select elite. The reality turned out to be far distant from the dream… (Sayyid-
Marsot, 2007, p. 97).  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to give the historical context of the time when Ali Abd 
ul-Raziq wrote his book. I historicized the political events that took place in Turkey and 
Egypt during the 1920s, which had an enormous effect on Raziq. Perhaps, Raziq would 
not have written his book if the sultanate and caliphate were not separated and 
abolished respectively. I argued that the debates over the caliphate in Turkey were one 
of the reasons for him to write his book. There is clear evidence that shows Raziq was 
following the theoretical discussions about the inseparability of sultanate and caliphate 
and the necessity of caliphate. Especially, he read and used some Seyyid Bey’s 
arguments. What he aimed with writing the book was to challenge scholars who argued 
against the abolition of the caliphate.  
 
As an Islamic scholar and a member of the Constitutionalist Party, Raziq opposed the 
Azharite scholars’ ambition for choosing the authoritarian King as Caliph. He feared that 
the King might become more authoritarian and close the assembly and party politics in 
Egypt. With writing the book as a member of Constitutionalists, he caused the political 
crisis in Egyptian politics, which eventually caused the dissolution of the coalition of his 
party constitutionalists with ittihadits.  
 
I argued that Raziq’s own story tells much about his source of arguments. His personal 
history, family connections, coming from a politicized family, his education, and the 
courses he took affected Raziq’s views. Without the knowledge of his personal story, his 
arguments cannot be analyzed.  
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CHAPTER III 
ALI ABD UL-RAZIQ AGAINST THE CLASSIC THEORY OF CALIPHATE 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Although Ali Abd ul-Raziq is known more for his arguments against caliphate in the 
literature, I argue that he did not contribute much to the literature. Instead, he became 
famous because while many scholars tried to re-establish the caliphate, he argued that 
the caliphate was not religiously necessary. Therefore, Raziq owns his popularity much 
to his provocative language not his arguments regarding the caliphate. As I will show in 
this chapter, many of arguments he made in his book were said either by Ibn Khaldun or 
Seyyid Bey previously, which Raziq gives reference to both of them. In this chapter, I 
discuss how Ali Abd ul-Raziq explains that the caliphate is unnecessary and justifies the 
abolition of the caliphate. To understand in what sense Raziq’s arguments differs from 
the mainstream understanding of the theory of the caliphate, I briefly explain the Sunni 
classic theory of the caliphate. Comparing Raziq’s and medieval scholars’ views would be 
appropriate for analyzing Raziq’s arguments.  
 
As I showed in the first chapter, Raziq was against the re-establishment of the caliphate, 
and he claimed that “there is no such thing as a political system with the specific label 
Islamic” (Abū-Zaid, 2006, p. 37). One of the main goals of Raziq was to prevent Azharite 
scholars from choosing King Fuad as the new caliph, which he believed it would be 
challenging to maintain constitutional monarchy under an authoritarian king. Of course, 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq does not state his real ambition in Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, but scholars 
agree that historical context profoundly influenced Raziq (Ali, 2009; Azimli, 2006; Black, 
2011; Broucek, 2012; Enayat, 1982; Hassan, 2016; Hatina, 2000; Hourani, 1983). I argue 
that Raziq’s book is not only an attempt to prevent King Fuad but also it is also a challenge 
to classic understanding of caliphate. 
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Caliphate was the first issue––and the cause of the major debates––that Muslims had to 
face after the Prophet’s death (Sarıbıyık, 2013). As a result, there has been an enormous 
literature about the caliphate and many scholars have written on the controversial topic, 
to name a few, al-Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, Ghazali, Ibn Jama‘a, 
Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Khaldun, Shams al-Din Muḥammad al-Dhahabi, Jalal al-Din Abd al-
Raḥman al-Suyuṭi, Abd al-Malik al- Juwayni and many more (Ali, 2009, p. 21; Ardıc,̦ 2012, 
pp. 78–142; Hassan, 2016, pp. 98–141; Rosenthal, 2009, pp. 33–89). Since the main goal 
of this chapter is to analyze Raziq’s arguments regarding the caliphate, I will not be able 
to discuss all the scholars’ arguments. Rather, I show the general understanding of the 
theory of caliphate. However, because Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Taymiyyah are 
the most known in the literature of the caliphate, I mostly compare Raziq’s arguments 
with these scholars.  
 
3.2. Temporary Solutions in Early Time  
After the Prophet’s death, the question of “who will be the head of the community?” 
became the central issue among Muslims. Choosing the leader of the Muslim community 
was not an easy task for Muslims. As a result, the discussion and disagreement started 
among Muslims even during choosing Abu Bakr as the first caliph (Azimli, 2006, pp. 68–
78). After Prophet’s death, Muslims of Media, Ansar (the helpers) immediately organized 
a meeting, known as Saqifa of Banu Saida, to choose the new leader. Without having the 
consent of Muhajirin (The Emigrants), Ansars decided to choose Sa'd Ubadah as the 
leader of the community. However, Muhajiruns believed that the caliph should to be a 
Qurashite descent (Parlak, 2012).  
 
Ibn Khaldun explains the first debate regarding the first political crisis among Muslims in 
the Saqifa of Banu Saida in the Muqaddima:  
 
On that day, the Ansar intended to render the oath of allegiance to Sa'd b. 
'Ubadah. They said: "One amir from among us and another from among you." But 
the Qurashites argued against them with Muhammad's statement, "The imams 
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are from among the Quraysh." They also argued that Muhammad had exhorted 
them "to do good to (those of the Ansar) who do good, and leave unpunished 
those of them who do evil." Now, (the Qurashites) said, if the leadership were to 
be given to (the Ansar), the latter would not have been recommended (to their 
care as indicated in Muhammad's statement). The Ansar bowed to these 
arguments and retracted their statement (just quoted), "One amir from among 
us, and another from among you." They gave up their intention to render the 
oath of allegiance to Sa'd (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 159). 
 
After the meetings, Abu Bakr became the first the caliph. However, given the discussion 
at the meetings, it appeared that the solution in the Saqifa was temporal. The discussions 
during the meeting were signs of the more significant problems in the future. 
Considering some Muslims initially did not give their bay’ah (allegiance) to Abu Bakr, the 
hadiths that Qurashites stated in the meeting was not seen convincing enough. Perhaps 
had the Prophet explicitly appointed a name as the leader of the Muslim community or 
outlined a political system for the future, this discussion could not have taken place 
(Ardıc,̦ 2012; Azimli, 2006).  
 
Because of the temporary solutions, the question “who and how to choose a caliph” has 
always become a problem for Muslims. In fact, history has many examples of how 
Muslims change the rules for choosing the next caliph. For instance, on the one hand, 
during electing Abu Bakr, Muslims did not wait for the arrival of those who were absent, 
and five electors among Muslims were seen as enough. On the other hand, when Umar 
was chosen as the second caliph, the necessary number for consultation increased to six 
(Māwardī, 2000, p. 5). While the Prophet did not appoint anyone the caliph, Abu Bakr 
appointed Umar as next caliph after him. The solutions were changed, which prevented 
Muslims from developing an organized political system. The way of the assessing the first 
two caliphs could have produced a set of rules of governance for Muslims if the rules 
were not changed after them. It could be understandable that Muslims did not want to 
set solid principles for choosing caliphs of the future generation due to the circumstances 
may change. Nevertheless, it also caused considerable confusion among Muslims 
throughout the centuries.  
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3.3. Classic Theory of Caliphate 
In general, the classic theory of the caliphate necessitates its foundation and, is argued 
that caliphate serves the interests of the Muslims, brings order and stability. As Hassan 
states a few have questioned the concept of the caliphate in the mediaeval era: “The 
universality of the general obligation to designate a leader for the Muslim community 
was so widely recognized that only a few third/ninth- century Mu’tazilite figures, chiefly 
al- Aṣamm and Hishām al- Fuwaṭī, are mentioned as adopting a position contrary to this 
overwhelming consensus, as are the Najadāt sect of the Kharijites.” (Hassan, 2016, p. 
100). Scholars such as al-Baqillani, al-Mawardi, Ghazali, Ibn Jama‘a, Ibn Taymiyya, and 
Ibn Khaldun discussed the concept of caliphate/imamate. While scholars had different 
opinions and there is no universal theory that all Muslims accept, it can be generalized 
that Sunni medieval scholars were in favor of caliphate for several different reasons such 
as public interest, order, and stability, signs of power, etc. For instance, while Al-Baqillani 
sees Qureyshi descent as a condition, Ibn Khaldun argues the caliph is not necessary 
should be Qureyshi decent. Medieval scholars discussed what the word “caliph” means, 
which term is correct, “the caliph of God” or “the caliph of the Messenger of the God,” 
who can be the caliph, how a caliph is chosen, who would choose a caliph and whether 
sharia law or reason requires formation of the institution, and they generally gave the 
same answers. 
 
Except for Ibn Taymiyyah, all the Sunni Muslim scholars mentioned here believed that it 
was a religious obligation to form an institution of the caliphate and obey the caliph. Al-
Baqillani argues that the function of imam or caliph is being the leader of the Islamic 
state, defend umma, apply sharia, and share revenues (Ali, 2009, p. 22). For him, the 
institution of the caliphate is an obligation on Muslims. Al-Ghazali argues that the 
caliphate is necessary because sharia requires, and he argues that umma had a 
consensus on the caliph (Ali, 2009, p. 28). For Ghazali, the imam should be qualified to 
be a leader, to be a knowledgeable and pious person (Ali, 2009, p. 29). More importantly, 
he argued that because many people had exaggerated the first caliphs and forget they 
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were also ordinary people, over times, they caused as if imams were infallible (Ali, 2009, 
p. 29). Ali states that “Ghazali holds an intermediary position between al-Mawardi (unity 
of the polity) and Ibn Taymiyya (political pluralism”) (Ali, 2009, p. 29). Ghazali believed 
that the appointment of an imam is an obligation based on Sunna, the consensus of the 
umma and its usefulness (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 39). Ghazali believed that there was a 
hadith as “Religion and -temporal- power are twins” and in his books, he uses sultan and 
imam interchangeably (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 39). Ibn Jama’a even uses the imam and 
sultan interchangeably (Ali, 2009; Rosenthal, 2009). He is concerned about stability. For 
instance, he said that “If a ruler acts with justice, the reward is his and it is for the people 
to give thanks; if the ruler is tyrannical, the crime is his, and it is for the people to be 
patient” (Ali, 2009, p. 30). He believes that caliphate can be established in three ways: 
Election, appointment, and forceful seizure (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 44). 
 
Unlike other Sunni scholars, Ibn Taymiyya does not focus on the imamate instead, he 
believes that obeying sharia plays the central role in his views (İbn Teymiye, 1999; 
Rosenthal, 2009, p. 52; Şahin, 2013). As the title of his book, Siyasa shari’a, shows, he 
put sharia in the first place, and he did not even discuss the qualifications of a caliph 
(Rosenthal, 2009, p. 52). He argues that a universal caliphate is not obligatory on Muslims 
and there can be more than one imam in different parts of the world (Ali, 2009, p. 31). 
For Taymiyya what is important is to have a harmony in the society between rulers and 
ulama (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 56). He was interested in strengthening the authority of 
ulama (Ali, 2009, p. 31). Taymiyya believed that the God did not ask Muslims to choose 
a caliph among them, instead the God says all the humans are the caliph, thus, instead 
of concern for choosing a caliph, all Muslims should aim to be caliphs, which is what the 
God wants and what sharia requires (İbn Teymiye, 1999; Rosenthal, 2009, p. 52; Şahin, 
2013). He argued that the caliphate is not obligatory, but it is preferable. For him, what 
is really matters is the power and strength of the caliph. If a caliph is powerful enough 
then he would be able to serve interests of Muslims and implement sharia.  Ibn 
Taymiyyah did not discuss whether caliphate is a religiously necessary institution or not 
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(Ali, 2009). For Taymiyyah, caliph and his administration must approach Muslims and 
society to the God (İbn Teymiye, 1999). Ali states “ignoring the political struggle of the 
time, Ibn Taymiyya focused heavily on the Shari‘a regime as the best for the Islamic 
umma. His main concern was a community guided by the Prophet’s Sunna (exemplary 
behavior) regardless of how tyrannical the leaders of such a community might be” (Ali, 
2009, p. 31).       
 
Like other scholars, Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun favored the institution of the caliphate and 
believed that they are obligated by Sharia to form the caliphate. Accordingly, forming a 
caliphate is a part of their religious obligation, and they maintained that authority has to 
be formed since Islam does not allow an anarchic system. For instance, Mawardi states 
that without authority in the world, Muslims would be in a chaotic situation and savagery 
(Māwardī, 2000, p. 3). Similarly, Ibn Khaldun states that “In no period were the people 
left in a state of anarchy. This was so by consensus, which proves that the position of 
imam is a necessary one.” (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 156). 
 
The term consensus is a crucial notion for Ibn Khaldun. He argues that after the death of 
the Prophet, Muslims around the Prophet––had an agreement––accepted Abu Bakr as 
the new leader of the community. In the succession of caliphate section of the 
Muhaddima, Ibn Khaldun says that appointment of a ruler is a part of religious law 
through the consensus of the Muslims. Ibn Khaldun maintains: 
 
A great number of the men around Muhammad were present on the first and on 
the second (occasion). None of them expressed the slightest disapproval. This 
shows that they were agreed upon the correctness of the procedure and 
recognized its legality. It is recognized that consensus constitutes proof. (Ibn-
Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 167).  
 
 
Mawardi in his book, the Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyyah Wat Wilayat Al Dinniyya, defines 
caliphate as “the Imamate, or supreme leadership is intended as vicariate of the 
prophecy in upholding the faith and managing the affairs of the World” (Māwardī, 2000, 
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p. 3). For Mawardi, imamate/caliphate is responsible for all affairs of Muslims (Geçit, 
2013, p. 318). As Antony Black states, Al-Mawardi believed that caliphate is "the 
keystone of the system” (Black, 2011, p. 87).  
 
Another major figure Ibn Khaldun provides the details on the early discussion about 
theories of the caliphate. Ibn Khaldun starts the chapters on the caliphate by explaining 
why authority is a necessity for Muslims. He believes that the social needs of humans 
created the obligation of authority, which the institution of caliphate fulfills. In the 
Muhaddima, Ibn Khaldun historicizes the caliphate/imamate and shows how the 
institution of caliphate evolved in centuries. Ibn Khaldun’s definition of caliphate 
demonstrates how vital the caliph is in Islam for him:  
 
It should be known that all the religious functions of the religious law, such as 
prayer, the office of judge, the office of mufti, the holy war, and market 
supervision (hisbah) fall under the "great imamate," which is the caliphate. (The 
caliphate) is a kind of great mainspring and comprehensive basis, and all these 
(functions) are branches of it and fall under it because of the wide scope of the 
caliphate, its active interest in all conditions of the Muslim community, both 
religious and worldly, and its general power to execute the religious laws relative 
to both (religious and worldly affairs) (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 171). 
 
Both Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun discuss whether the obligation of the establishment of a 
caliphate on Muslim is the ‘rational necessity of mankind’ or ‘imposed by sharia.’ They 
support that religious law itself requires establishing a caliphate, and they believe that 
establishing the caliphate and obeying the caliph are a part of religious duty (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 
1989, p. 156; Māwardī, 2000, pp. 1–2). Mawardi states that those who believe that 
religious law requires imamate disputes that without considering faith, legal decisions 
may not be appropriate with the revealed law. To be clear, although Mawardi and Ibn 
Khaldun believed that revealed law requires a religious authority, they did not oppose 
rational necessities for establishing a caliphate. As Yücesoy states  
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What these scholars were suggesting was not that human reason was incapable 
of comprehending whether or not leadership was necessary, but rather that the 
imamate as an institution was prescribed for Muslims and that religious law 
provided a better and a clearer way of knowing the kind of rulership that the 
Muslim community needed; the imamate’s specific functions could not be known 
by reason alone (Yücesoy, 2016, p. 20). 
 
According to the imamate theory of Mawardi, a supreme leader can be elected or 
appointed by predecessor (Māwardī, 2000, p. 5). Once the appointment or election 
result, the whole Muslims need to learn about the result and the caliph. Although 
Mawardi states Qureshi descent as a condition for eligibility to be a caliph, Ibn Khaldun 
believes that being a Qurashite descent is not necessarily a condition for eligibility to be 
caliph. Ibn Khaldun argues: 
 
The power of the Quraysh weakened. Their group feeling vanished in 
consequence of the life of luxury and prosperity they led, and in consequence of 
the fact that the dynasty expended them all over the earth. (The Qurashites) Thus 
became too weak to fulfill the duties of the caliphate. The non-Arabs gained 
superiority over them, and the executive power fell into their hands (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 
1989, p. 159).  
 
Ibn Khaldun sees that if a descent can serve the best interest of the public, then imamate 
can choose from that descent. After giving historical information about, Ibn Khaldun 
argues that during the early period of Islam, Qurashite tribe was powerful and had a 
stronger regarding the “group feeling,” that is why they were the best group that could 
serve the interest of the public, and hence the being qurashite became a condition for 
imamate (Azimli, 2006, p. 41). Ibn Khaldun states that “Islam does not consider 
preservation of (the ruler's) inheritance for his children the proper purpose in appointing 
a successor. The (succession to the rule) is something that comes from God who 
distinguishes by it whomsoever He wishes.” (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 169). Ibn Khaldun sees 
the caliphate as a public interest, and he supports the idea of the necessity of the 
caliphate because he believes that it serves the best interests of the public. He argues 
that the institution of the caliphate is a part of the religious law.  
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While Ibn Khaldun believes that the institution of the caliphate is an obligation on 
Muslims, he acknowledges that the caliphate is transformed into royal authority after 
the first four caliphs. He states that “The form of government, in the beginning, was a 
caliphate,” but he discusses that “the characteristic traits of the caliphate disappeared, 
and only its name remained” which eventually led caliphate to become a matter of group 
feeling and sword (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 166). One of the critical contributions that Ibn 
Khaldun makes in the theories of the caliphate is that he asserts that caliphate is not one 
of the pillars of the faith and he accepts that the Prophet did not appoint anyone for a 
successor. If it were a pillar of the faith, the Prophet would have given a clear answer to 
Muslims around him. Ibn Khaldun: 
 
The doubt of the Imamiyah in this matter is caused by the fact that they assume 
the imamate to be one of the pillars of the faith. This is not so. It is one of the 
general (public) interests. The people are delegated to take care of it. If it were 
one of the pillars of the faith, it would be something like prayer, and 
(Muhammad) would have appointed a representative (caliph), exactly as he 
appointed Abu Bakr to represent him at prayer. (Had he done so,) It would have 
become generally known, as was the case with the matter of prayer. … It also 
shows that the question of the imamate and succession to it was not as important 
then as it is today…. (At that time,) Islam was winning the hearts of the people 
and causing them to be willing to die for it in a way that disrupted the customary 
course of affairs. … it was not necessary to pay any attention to group 
feeling…The (questions of) caliphate and royal authority and that of the 
succession to both became very important affairs in the opinion of the people. It 
had not been this way before. It should be noted how unimportant the caliphate 
was in the time of the Prophet, (so unimportant that) he did not appoint a 
successor to it…. (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 170).  
 
3.4. Raziq’s Challenge to Classic Theory of Caliphate 
While scholars argued that Muslims need to establish a caliphate for a variety of reasons, 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq came out with different arguments. He claimed that the caliphate is not 
a mandatory religious institution, and it is not among the tenets of the faith. Raziq 
maintained that the caliphate is a political institution. In fact, he was “one prominent 
scholar who took this position, defending his unorthodox views, with arguments and 
rationales from within the Islamic legal culture” (Meiloud, 2017, p. 341). In his Al-Islām 
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wa Usūl al-Hukm, Raziq argues that the caliphate is not a religious regime, and Islam does 
not require Muslims to form a caliphate, and more importantly, Raziq denies the transfer 
of political legitimacy from the Prophet to the caliphs (Binder, 1988, p. 131).  
 
It should be stated that Raziq uses a very assertive language that might hurt someone or 
threatened a traditional view over the caliphate among Muslims. As Kedourie states 
Raziq’s “argument is so novel, both theologically and historically, it could easily and with 
considerable justification be denounced as a heresy” (Kedourie, 1963, p. 223). Meiloud 
argues that the book may not create such reaction if it were not published right after the 
abolition of the caliphate (Meiloud, 2017, p. 73). Did not Raziq expect such a reaction to 
his book? The answer would be in fact he was aware of the trouble, but it did not stop 
him. This can be understood from Raziq’s words at the beginning of the book: He states 
that “I worship and fear none but Him… He is my only recourse and my best protector.” 
 
Raziq states that his book is an “investigation of the caliphate” which he studied on over 
ten years. He maintains that the book is a product of long-term research and readings 
while working as a judge in the Islamic courts of Egypt (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 21). Raziq 
wants his book to be seen as a scholarly book not an answer to certain scholars or 
propaganda against the King Fouad. I argue that whether Raziq wrote his book in a few 
months or over ten years, and even if Raziq had political ambitions against King Fouad, 
he reminded some aspects of the theory of caliphate that had been forgotten throughout 
the centuries. 
 
Raziq states that two main topics that he wants to discuss in his book, one is “caliphate” 
and the other is “the theory of political power in Islam.” However, one can easily 
acknowledge that the whole aim of the book is to disprove the institution of the caliphate 
as an Islamic concept. It can be argued that the discussion regarding caliphate has the 
central importance in the book. However, it should be stated that Raziq was not criticized 
because of his argument about the caliphate but because of his arguments about the 
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political power in Islam. While Ali states that Raziq’s arguments are “direct 
deconstruction of al-Mawardi’s theory” (Ali, 2009, p. 72), Binder states that Raziq’s 
arguments depend on Ibn Khaldun’s views of the caliphate (Binder, 1988, p. 132).  
 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq starts with the discussion of the linguistic origin of the word “caliphate” 
as Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun did. He defines “caliphate” as “deputizing for someone,” 
“succeeding him” or “following in his wake” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 25). The author 
shows that there are two approaches to the theory of the caliphate. He categorizes them 
as a) caliph derives his authority and power directly from God b) caliph derives his 
authority from the umma. The first approach is not common, which Ibn Khaldun shows 
that this term was not used during the first four caliphs (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 156). 
However, Raziq indicates that in fact there were some rulers and scholars that used the 
term “caliph of God” after the four caliphs. For instance, Raziq gives some names who 
interpreted caliph as the “shadow of God on earth” such as Abu Ja’afar al-Mansur (ʻAbd 
al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 31). He also shows that there were several poets and writings of several 
religious scholars that attribute a divine mission to the caliph during the Ummayid and 
Abbasid period.  
 
One and the most common approach is that caliph is seen as the representative of 
Prophet and derives his authority from the umma. This is the classic understanding of 
most of the medieval scholars, but Raziq does not stress the information because he 
does not want to contradict with his argument that Muslims saw the caliphs as “shadow 
of the God.”  
 
Raziq’s arguments can be classified into three groups. He argued that nothing in Quran 
justifies the institution of the Caliphate, that there is no single verifiable hadith that 
shows the Prophet advocated the system of the caliphate and appointed a person to be 
the first caliph. Lastly, he believed that not only the Quran and Sunna do not justify the 
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caliphate but also there has never been a consensus (ijma) of ulama on the necessity of 
the caliphate in the history.  
 
3. 4.1 Nothing in Quran on Caliphate 
Raziq states that scholars––like Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun––advocate the obedience to 
the caliph, who see that obeying to the Imam is equivalent to obedience to the Prophet 
and thus the God. For instance, Ibn Khaldun states that “disobedience makes itself 
noticeable and leads to trouble and bloodshed” (Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 154). Raziq states 
that two verses are used when scholars discuss obedience to authority: 
 
O believers, obey God and obey the Prophet and those set in authority over you. 
(4:59) 
 
When there comes to them a report, bearing news of security or of foreboding, 
they spread it wide. Were they to refer it to the Messenger and to those set in 
authority over them, its true import would be ascertained from them by those 
best fitted to understand it. (4.83) 
 
However, he believes that the expression “those in authority” in the verses do not 
support the establishment of the caliphate. Hourani states that Raziq sees the verses as 
“vague general statements enjoining respect for those in authority” (Hourani, 1983, p. 
185). Raziq argued that the verses could be interpreted as “certain people present, 
among Muslims, are entrusted with the conduct of their public affairs” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 
2012, p. 37). Raziq does not elaborate these two verses and instead he refers the 
orientalist Sir Thomas Arnold’s “The Caliphate” for more details about the verses, which 
he believes that Arnold explains well. It should be noted that Raziq receives most of the 
criticisms about the caliphate because of giving reference to Arnold. For instance, James 
Broucek shows that scholars like Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit and Shaykh Muhammad al-
Khidr Husayn criticized Raziq for being influenced by European scholarship (Broucek, 
2012, p. 210).  Bakhit stated that “The consensus of Muslims is that the claim of a non-
Muslim, about matters pertaining to the religion of Islam, is unacceptable—especially 
when pertaining to the caliphate” (Broucek, 2012, p. 210). However, as I showed in the 
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previous chapter, many scholars argue that the roots of the Raziq’s arguments do not 
come from western thoughts. Moreover, stateting a few ideas from western scholars do 
not make Raziq’s arguments as western oriented. However, it could have been 
strengthened Raziq’s argument about the argument that the Quran does not have 
anything about the caliphate as a political system, if he used alternative sources.   
Moreover, Raziq argues that Quran shows all possible explanations and details about all 
aspects of Islam, which he states the verse “We have not neglected any matter in this 
Book (6:38)” and disputes that if caliphate is a part of Muslim’s duty why does not Quran 
say anything about it? Raziq argues: 
 
None of the scholars who attested that the appointment of an imam was a 
religious duty could substantiate this thesis with a verse from the Quran. If such 
a verse had existed, the scholars concerned would not have hesitated to utilize 
and expound it at length. Had there existed a mere shred of evidence in favor of 
the thesis of the Imamate as an obligation, the more zealous among the 
proponents of the caliphate would have taken this hint as complete proof. 
However, the scholars, whether neutral or partial to the caliphate, were unable 
to find any arguments in favor of their thesis in God’s book. Therefore, they 
satisfied themselves with the legal thesis that a consensus had been reached on 
the subject, with further, logical elaborations (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 36). 
 
While Raziq did not elaborate on what he understands from the verses, it seems that he 
reads the verses the way Mark Wegner reads. Wegner argues that the verses about 
obeying authority are not helpful for forming a theory of caliphate:  
 
On the one hand they are formulated as general statements about authority no 
more applicable to the institution of the caliphate than to any other type of 
government. On the other, they all occur in such specific contexts—duly recorded 
by the tafsir interpretation—that it is a stretch to interpret them as being 
intended as guidelines for general application (Wegner, 2001, p. 94).  
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3.4.2 No Verifiable Hadiths on Caliphate 
Raziq argues that not only Quran does not state anything about the caliphate as an 
institution, but the Prophet did not say anything about the concept of the caliphate and 
did not appoint a caliph when he died (Ali, 2009, p. 73). He believes that “the religious 
scholars were unable to provide even a single hadith in support of their case on this issue. 
Had they found the least evidence to buttress their argument in the Sunna, they would 
have used it to reinforce the idea of unanimous agreement” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 38). 
In fact, there are several hadiths that medieval scholars attributed to the Prophet about 
the necessity of caliphate and appointing Abu Bakr as the caliph, but scholars dispute 
their authenticity (Wegner, 2001, p. 99).   
 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq criticizes Rashid Rida, for believing in the idea that the caliphate has a 
place in prophet's tradition. He believes that the book that Rida gives a reference––
Taftazani’s al-Maqasid––does not have any proofs from Quran or the Sunna of the 
Prophet (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 39). Wegner also sees it as peculiar that the Prophet who 
did not make any reference to the Quran regarding the caliphate, had many statements 
about the caliphate. Like Raziq, Wegner argues that “It seems more likely that a majority 
of these hadiths came into circulation after the Prophet's death as part of the ongoing 
polemic about what form of government was best suited to perpetuate his legacy” 
(Wegner, 2001, pp. 99–100).  
 
Raziq claims that the words of the Prophet like “imamate,” “allegiance” and 
“community” are allusions, and they do not justify the necessity of caliphate (Hourani, 
1983, p. 185). He argues that these words in the Islamic discourse do not have the same 
interpretation with their uses in the religious law (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 40). Similarly, 
Wegner asserts that “amir” or “imam” interpreted as referring to the caliphate but had 
different meanings (Wegner, 2001, p. 100). Wegner shows many hadiths (denoted by 
imam or amir) that used for the legitimization of obedience to the caliphate. Raziq states 
that “the allusions to the concepts of “caliphate,” “imamate” and “allegiance” in the 
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Prophet’s hadiths do not mean anything beyond what Christ meant when he referred to 
the legal requirements pertaining to the government of Caesar” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 
41). Here Raziq, quotes the famous phrase “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” and 
tried to show that even if Christ used the phrase, it does not mean that there will always 
be Caesar (Hourani, 1983, p. 185). Raziq states that this phrase does not attribute a 
sacred power to Caesar and it does not mean that recognizing the authority of Caesar is 
a part of divine duty that Christians should take into consideration.  
 
Raziq believes that all the hadiths and words of the Prophet do not “support the claim 
that the sharia conclusively lays down the principle of the caliphate or the great 
imamate, understood as a deputyship for the Prophet and a fulfilment of the functions 
that he undertook among Muslims” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 40). He debates that if it is 
true that the Prophet commanded Muslims to obey an imam, the God also commands 
Muslims to be fair with the agreements and deals with polytheists. He argues that it does 
not mean that the God accepts polytheism. Similarly, Raziq states that sharia requires 
Muslims to obey tyrants if acting otherwise increase disorder, but it does not mean that 
tyranny is legitimate. He continues to give examples:  
 
Again, God talks to us about slavery. He exhorts us to set slaves free, to treat 
them well and lays down several other recommendations regarding them. 
However, this does not imply that slavery is a religious obligation, or that it is 
desirable. The same applies to issues such as divorce, borrowing, commerce, 
mortgaging and so on, frequently mentioned in the God’s book and plainly 
regulated in His law. This does not mean that these issues are religious duties, or 
that they have a special significance for God (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 41). 
 
By giving all these examples, Raziq tries to convince that anything written in the Quran 
and done by the Prophet is not significant only because it is stated in Quran or done by 
the Prophet, but the whole message is more important. He argues that the terms 
“imamate,” “caliphate” and “allegiance” do not justify an institution of caliphate only 
because Quran states about “those in authority,” or the Prophet used the words of 
“imam” or “caliph.” As Binder states, for Raziq “neither political power, nor polytheism, 
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nor slavery, nor any of the other topics of Quranic legislation are rendered obligatory 
simply because it is discussed in Quran” (Binder, 1988, pp. 137–138). 
 
3.4.3 No Consensus (ijma) on Caliphate  
The third point is that––unlike Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun, –– Raziq claims that there has 
never been a consensus over the caliphate throughout the Islamic history (Hourani, 
1983, p. 185). He uses words of Mawaqif who argues that the consensus was only 
available during the contemporaries of the Prophet and discusses that Mawaqis’s 
statement shows that the consensus over caliphate is not something that can be 
verifiable (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 38). Raziq believed that it is difficult to know whether 
ijma exists or if it exists, is it possible to known (Wegner, 2001, p. 200). Wegner states 
that Raziq argues “there is no record of a mustanad (roughly "base rationale") for the 
ijma about the necessity of establishing the caliphate in general. There is no evidence of 
either tacit (sukut) or explicit (sarih) ijma on the elections of any individual caliph” 
(Wegner, 2001, p. 201).  
 
Raziq does not believe that there was a consensus on necessity of the caliphate.  While 
Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun stated Mu’tazilas and Kharijites as those who were heretics 
because they did not believe in the necessity of caliphate, Raziq gives similar examples 
to show that without Mu’tazilas and Kharijites, no one can argue about that there was 
an ijma of scholars (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 52). Nevertheless, Raziq did not discuss ijma 
argument in details. Perhaps, the main reason is that he was confident enough with the 
first two arguments and did not need to elaborate on the third one, but the Azharite 
scholars accused Raziq of disregarding the ijma of scholars. Instead, he tried to explain 
why and how political science has been neglected by Muslims over centuries. He 
believed that because caliphs were powerful and used force, no one could say or develop 
an alternative system that could challenge his authority. Similarly, he argues it would be 
clearer if Muslim political scientists could write freely on the subject (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, 
p. 46).  
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Binder states that “Abd al-Raziq’s purpose is to demolish the argument that the caliphate 
is required by the sharia as determined by a consensus of the umma” (Binder, 1988, p. 
136). Wegner states that  
 
Islam is no less aware of the ambiguities inherent in the principle of ijma than of 
the danger of hadith fabrication. Its potential for self-serving justification of the 
status quo—particularly in the realm of government and politics—is obvious: 
since the outcome of any political struggle can be interpreted as a consequence 
of an ijma of the community, and since any ijma of the community is an 
expression of God's will, all historical events can be stamped with ex-post facto 
divine approval (Wegner, 2001, p. 25).  
 
It seems that Raziq would agree with Wegner. For Raziq, if there is an ijma on a specific 
issue everybody has to accept it. For instance, he criticized Ibn Khaldun for saying that 
there was a consensus (ijma) for establishing an institution of caliphate. Raziq asked how 
could there be a consensus if Mutazilites and Kharijites did not agree upon necessity of 
caliphate. It is clear that Raziq sees the term ijma as something that cannot be used to 
justify any system or change in Islam. For him, only if all Muslims agreed upon a concept, 
system or rule to be adopted or to be changed, then there can be a proper ijma.  
 
Raziq does not elaborate why he argues that there has not been ijma on the necessity of 
the caliphate. Raziq asks if the Quran did not mention, and the Prophet did not say 
anything about the caliphate, and if there is no Ijma on caliphate “can one still talk about 
a religious duty in the absence of any support for this thesis, be it in the sacred book, the 
tradition of the Prophet or by way of unanimous agreement on the part of the 
believers?” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 52).  
 
3.4.4. Roots of Caliphate: Coercion and Sword  
Raziq maintains that the history shows that the caliph has always faced opposition 
among Muslims, but they could not do anything about it (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 45). He 
argues that the institution of the caliphate has never been based on voluntary allegiance. 
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He states that history shows that caliphate was founded on “sheer coercion and that in 
the most instance this took the form of physical, military coercion” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, 
pp. 46–47). Raziq differentiates the first three caliphs whose authority, and states that 
they may not rely on physical force and coercion, but Raziq believes that “‘Ali and 
Mu’awiyya, the fourth and fifth caliphs, rose to the caliphate by means of the sword,” 
which became a trend in following centuries. Even if Raziq differentiates the first three 
caliphs, in the following chapter, he contradicts himself when he argues that even Abu 
Bakr was the first king whose authority was based on military power. Raziq states that 
“We have no doubt that coercion has always been the basis of the caliphate. History does 
not offer us a single example of a caliph whose image is not associated with the fear 
inspired by the brutal force surrounding him, with the armed force supporting him, and 
the unsheathed swords that lent him protection” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 47). Moreover, 
Raziq claims that there has been an incontestable link between the institution of the 
caliphate and the use of violence. Raziq even goes much further to state that “The 
caliphate has always been, and still remains, a disaster for Islam and for Muslims. It has 
been a constant source of evil and corruption” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 54). This 
provocative statement shows the selective approach of Raziq regarding reading 
historical information. Raziq blames the institution of caliphate as a source of all the 
disasters in the Islamic history.  
 
3.4.5. Is Caliphate Necessary?  
After discussing all three aspects of the arguments, Raziq argues that there is only one 
argument that left to discuss, which is the idea that a caliphate is necessary for Muslim. 
Raziq argued that some scholars see the caliphate as a “condition for the practice of 
religion” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 52). However, Raziq gives the example of Mongol 
invasion when Muslims lived for three years without a caliph, and he argues that Muslims 
were able to continue their life and practice their religious beliefs. He states that  
 
What was the situation of the extensive realm of Islam beyond Egypt, where the 
shackles of the caliphate had been cast away, where its authority was 
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disregarded, and whose inhabitants have lived, and still live, free from the 
shadow of the caliphs and their supposedly sacred glory? Were the practices of 
faith neglected there more than anywhere else? Did any single catastrophe befall 
them? Did the sky over their temporal realm cave in when the caliphal star 
vanished from it? Did the bounty of the sky and the earth disappear when the 
caliph was gone? None of this came to pass (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 56). 
 
He states that like other communities, Muslims also need to form governments to 
organize their public affairs. If these scholars see the caliphate as equivalent to a 
government that Muslims need to establish for their worldly matters, then they were 
right, Raziq said. In that case, the caliphate would be like the forms of personal, or 
republican, despotic, constitutional, consensual, democratic, Bolshevik government. 
However, if the scholars see the caliphate as an institution that is based on religion, then 
their arguments are weak and need further evidence (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, pp. 53–54). 
He states that “neither the conduct of our spiritual life nor the direction of our temporal 
affairs calls for the caliphate” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 54). Scholars argue that Raziq 
reduced Islam to the realm of spirit and separated Islam from state, which I explain in 
the next chapter, and he limits Islam’s concerns to only theology, ethics and rituals 
(Azmeh, 2016, p. 4; Jadaane, 1985, p. 45). 
 
Raziq argued that from the early days of Islam, the caliphate was seen as a religious 
institution rather than political, and this “erroneous view” supported by scholars and 
political authorities over centuries. However, he states that  
 
They did so with a view to protecting their throne and suppressing their 
opponents in the name of religion. They were relentless in inculcating this belief 
among the masses through numerous means––the belief, namely, that 
obedience to rulers is tantamount to obedience to God; and rebellion against 
them, a rebellion against God (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 116).  
 
Raziq states that kingships (despots) misled Muslims, blocked the doors of knowledge, 
prevent them from developing political systems, theories, and concepts. In his words, 
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“These despots have likewise thwarted an understanding of religion and imprisoned 
Muslims within the mental boundaries set by them” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 117). 
 
3.5. Ibn Khaldun and Raziq 
Ibn Khaldun’s works over the caliphate have central importance in Raziq’s arguments, 
and he gives many examples from Ibn Khaldun’s work (Binder, 1988, p. 132).  For 
instance, while he uses Ibn Khaldun’s arguments to support his thesis––e.g., caliphate 
became a kingship later––, he opposes Ibn Khaldun––e.g., there is a consensus on the 
necessity of caliphate. Ibn Khaldun states that Khajarites and Mu'tazila were the 
exceptions, they did not support the idea of the necessity of the caliphate. For Raziq, one 
cannot say that there was an ijma if some Muslims Khajarites and Mutezilas were 
excluded (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 45; Ibn-Ḫaldūn, 1989, p. 157). Adams states that Raziq 
placed himself in the category of Kharijites with the denial of the caliphate (Adams, 1968, 
p. 266). 
 
Another example that both Ibn Khaldun and Raziq agree on is that the caliphate is not 
one of the pillars of the faith. Raziq states that Muslims treated the institution of the 
“caliphate” as a matter in the religious science and gave high status as if it is a pillar of 
the faith, but in fact, it is not (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 117). It can be understood that Raziq 
borrows this idea from Ibn Khaldun. Like Ibn Khaldun, he asks if this topic is a vital issue 
for Muslims why did not the Quran explicitly state anything, why did not the Prophet 
appoint any successor, and why have there been many debates on the question of 
caliphate without a concrete solution?  
 
While Raziq criticizes Ibn Khaldun’s ideas such as the necessity of the caliphate, he also 
supports Ibn Khaldun for specific arguments. For instance, Raziq supports Ibn Khaldun’s 
words on the kingship that its established based on “superiority and the power to rule 
by force; kingship is nothing but coercion and rule by constraints” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, 
p. 48). However, Raziq’s argument is different from Ibn Khaldun’s in the sense that while 
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Ibn Khaldun argued that caliphate transformed into kingship, Raziq argued that even 
there is no caliphate in Islam let alone its transformation to kingship. Raziq states that 
there were countless examples regarding how rulers obtain the title of caliph through 
the history. Azimli criticizes Raziq for picking the wrong examples to make his arguments 
stronger (Azimli, 2001).  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Indeed, the historical context of Raziq’s book matters, Raziq may not write his book if 
the caliphate was not abolished, if the King Fuad did not want to be the new caliph or if 
Azharite scholars did not believe that caliphate is religiously a necessary institution. 
However, one cannot underestimate Raziq’s stated arguments in the book against the 
classic theory of the caliphate. Of course, it would be more academically persuasive if 
Raziq organized his thought and support his arguments. Perhaps, this drawback of the 
book is an indicator for the scholars who argued that Raziq rushed to write his book in a 
few months to tackle Azharites and King Fouad. 
 
The classic theory of the caliphate sees the foundation of the caliphate and obeying the 
caliph as a religious duty. Accordingly, the caliph is responsible for stability, order, public 
interests and safety of Muslims as well as approaching Muslims to the God. However, 
Raziq claimed that in fact the caliphate could not be legitimized by religious principles. 
He argued that the caliphate is merely a political institution that has nothing to do with 
religion. Many times, he refers to Ibn Khaldun’s words regarding the history of the 
caliphate to show how it was used by political authorities for legitimizing their kingship. 
In general, Raziq did not bring an original thought other than restating Ibn Khaldun’s 
words and the bad examples of caliphs in the history. In fact, Raziq owed his popularity 
to his assertive language and radical views regarding caliphate. Raziq, like Ibn Khaldun, 
accepts that the caliphate did not appoint a caliph and the caliphate is not a pillar of 
Islam. Raziq is wrong when he argued that most Muslim scholars saw caliph as a “the 
caliph of the God” because as I showed most of the medieval scholars believed that 
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caliphate is necessary for the stability, order, power and public interests of Muslims. 
They did not attribute religious importance, as Raziq claims. 
 
Perhaps, no one would criticize Raziq, or he might not lose his sharia judge position if he 
only had discussed the concept of the caliphate. However, besides Raziq’s arguments 
about the classic theory of the caliphate, Raziq carries the discussion to much broader 
level by discussing the political legitimacy of the Prophet and political power in Islam. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NATURE OF PROPHET’S AUTHORITY AND STATE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
After discussing the concept of the caliphate in Islam, Ali Abd ul-Raziq questions the 
entire governance in the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Raziq examines whether the 
Prophet was a king and whether he established a state or not. It should be noted that 
when compared to his theory of caliphate, questioning the political system of the early 
period of Islam is where Raziq has received most of the criticisms. Raziq’s alternative 
path for understanding religion-state relations faced vehement opposition in the early 
twentieth century. In fact, five––out of seven––reasons of Azharite ulama for expelling 
Raziq from his judge position were about his views on political authority and system in 
Islam. Similarly, due to Raziq’s assertive language and unorganized thoughts, his views 
and arguments did not find support among Egyptian society except some members of 
the Liberal Constitutionalist Party during the 1930s. In fact, he even became an object of 
derision in Egypt. For instance, Wafd Party’s Saad Zaghloul said for him that “he was 
amazed first of all by how a scholar of Islam could write in this manner on this issue” 
(Pankhurst, 2010, p. 835). On June 23, Rashid Rida published an update to refute Raziq’s 
arguments and asked other Azharite scholars to reject them (Broucek, 2012, p. 203). Rida 
claimed that the enemies of Islam could use Raziq's book (Hourani, 1983, p. 189. Hourani 
states that it was understandable why Raziq’s ideas received so many oppositions: 
Because Raziq “propounded a new historical theory about matters of which the accepted 
historical view had something of the nature of religious doctrine…” (Hourani, 1983, p. 
189).  
 
With all the discrepancies and bold claims, it can be stated that Raziq broadened the 
literature of Islam and politics. I argue that Raziq uses a selective approach to Quranic 
verses and Hadiths to strengthen his arguments and faces difficulties to convince readers 
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in many cases. In these cases, he tries to escape from the critics by highlighting ambiguity 
and lack of knowledge about the history of the early period of Islam. Indeed, he could 
have launched a new understanding of the political system, if his arguments were good 
enough and less heated. However, I argue that the debate over Raziq’s case between 
orthodox and secular Muslims made conservative Islamic movements more robust 
(Jadaane 1985; Azmeh 2016). For instance, modern political Islamist movements are all 
offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, and they all denounced Abd al-Raziq and his book 
(Abū-Zaid, 2006, p. 46).  
 
What did Raziq argue? How un-orthodox were his views? Raziq claimed that 
i. Islam is revealed for the people not for the states. 
ii. Islam is silent regarding the political systems.  
iii. The Prophet was not a king; he did not form an Islamic state. 
iv. Governing was not part of the Prophet’s mission. 
v. The Prophet was only a spiritual leader 
vi. Being a political leader was not part of the Prophet’s mission. 
vii. Abu Bakr was the first king in the Islamic history. 
viii. Abu Bakr’s administration was secular and only political. 
ix. Jihad is a political means rather than a religious one. 
 
With these bold claims, Raziq aims to challenge three central assumptions: a) all Muslims 
need to be unified and aim to form an Islamic state that was once founded by the 
Prophet, b) The Prophet Muhammad was both spiritual and political leader of the 
community, and Islam and state are interconnected and cannot be separated, c) the four 
“rightly-guided” caliphs had religious mission. In this chapter, I examine how Ali Abd ul-
Raziq challenges the three assumptions. To do that, first, I give a short overview of how 
the notions of political authority and system were understood. By doing that, I believe it 
would be the right way to comprehend how Raziq differs from the mainstream 
 56 
 
understanding. Secondly, I discuss Raziq’s arguments by dividing them into several 
themes. While analyzing Raziq’s case, I also address the criticisms to his theses. Lastly, I 
present some scholars who, I believe, have similar ideas as Raziq even if they do not have 
a direct connection.   
 
4.2. Mainstream Views of Political Authority and State in Islam 
The concept of “Islamic state” has increasingly become popular among Muslim scholars 
in the last two centuries. It is believed that the Prophet formed an Islamic state, which 
was established in Medina after the migration (Hegira) in 622. Accordingly, the Prophet 
was not just only a messenger but also the political leader of the community (Ashour, 
2018; Rayyıs, 1995). Islamists such as Hassan al-Banna, Abul A’la Maududi, or Yusuf al-
Qaradawi believe that the Prophet formed the Islamic state (Afsaruddin, 2006, p. 154; 
Ashour, 2018, p. 8; Pankhurst, 2010, p. 840). Similarly, some western scholars also argue 
that the Prophet had a political mission, and he was the political leader as well as the 
founder of the Islamic state. It can be argued that from Ghazali to Qaradawi and from 
Islamists to Orientalists, in general, scholars believe that political goals were inseparable 
from the mission of the Messenger. 
 
4.2.1 Medieval Muslim scholars’ Views 
As we see in al-Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun’s views in the previous chapter, the Sunni 
Muslims scholars see forming an authority or a political system as necessary. While 
Mawardi believes that building political authority is a religious obligation, Ibn Khaldun 
argues it is necessary for serving public interests of Muslims in the world. Similarly, al-
Ghazali also argues that political power needs to be formed because humans are 
incapable of living alone (Yücesoy, 2011, p. 22). He states in his Ihya Ulum al-Din (The 
Revival of the Religious Sciences), “Rule and religion are twins; religion is the base and 
authority is the guardian. Anything without a base will inevitably be ruined, and anything 
without a guardian inevitably will be lost” (Qaradawi, 1998, pp. 19–20).  
 
 57 
 
Another key figure in the Islamic political thought, Ibn Taymiyyah believes that people’s 
need creates a community, which he sees an initial point for a “vilayah” or state to be 
formed (İbn Teymiye, 1999, p. 194; Şahin, 2013). It is important to see that both Ghazali 
and Taymiyyah see the political authority as a tool for approaching to God. For 
Taymiyyah, a state or a political authority has to be an instrument for serving religion 
(Şahin, 2013, p. 620). While Taymiyyah does not see the caliphate as a necessary for 
Islam, he believes that there should be an authority for serving the interests of Islam on 
the earth. Rosenthal argues that Taymiyyah shifted from the long-debated concept of 
the caliphate to the concept of a religious society where everybody is supposed to be a 
caliph (E. I. Rosenthal, 1996, p. 78). In his book, Taymiyyah quotes the statement that 
“Forty years with a cruel imam is better than one day without a sultan or leader” (İbn 
Teymiye 1999, 195), which demonstrates that like al-Mawardi and Ibn Khaldun, he holds 
that without a ruler there would be “fitna” (strife) and bloodsheds or anarchy (Şahin, 
2013, p. 623). Other than Kharijis and Mutazilis, which are labeled as “anarchist” 
(Yücesoy, 2011, p. 13), it can be generalized that Muslim scholars do not differentiate 
between religious and worldly authority and believe that Muslims are required to form 
a political body (Crone, 2005, p. 11; Rayyıs, 1995). 
 
4.2.2 Contemporary Muslim Scholars’ Views 
Most of the Sunni scholars in the twentieth century believe that the state cannot be 
separated from Islam. For them, Mohammad, as a prophet and a statesman, established 
a state and showed the appropriate way of governing a people. Thus, the idea of 
differentiating between the divine and the worldly authority of the Prophet is not 
something that they accept. For instance, Muhammad Diya’ al-Din Rayyis states that 
there is no doubt that the Prophet established a system, which accommodates all the 
factors that define the modern notion of “political” (Rayyıs, 1995, p. 30). He argues that 
subjectively or objectively, Islam encompasses all the factors and has the full authority 
to change everything in the life of Muslims, and thus he adamantly refuses the 
separation of the world and heaven in Islam (Rayyıs, 1995, p. 30). Rayyis argues that 
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those who try to limit Islam to heavenly matters, they are in a miserable condition 
(Rayyıs, 1995, p. 31).  
 
Muslim scholars believe that while the forming a state was not a significant concern for 
the Prophet in Mecca, it became one of the goals when the Messenger decided to 
migrate to Medina. For instance, Muhammad Selim Avva believes that the migration to 
Medina started the process of “Islamic political community,” which he argues had three 
levels (Avva, 2011). First, after the migration, Muslims finally felt safe, and more 
importantly accepted Medina as a new home. Avva defines this level as “regional 
dependence.” Secondly, with the level of “social conscience,” hearth and thoughts of the 
people coalesced for common goals that helped Muslims to reach the final (third) level 
of “political society” (Avva, 2011, p. 37). A similar argument can also be found in many 
other works (Ammara, 1991, p. 332; Ashour, 2018; Qaradawi, 1998; Rayyıs, 1995, pp. 
28–34). Amara argues that many signs indicate how the Prophet Muhammad formed a 
state, and how he was acting as the political leader of the community (Ammara, 1991). 
For instance, the Prophet had meetings with the leaders of tribes such as Aws and 
Khazraj, and he negotiated with the non-Muslims for creating a new constitution of 
Medina, as well as he sent ambassadors to dynasties and tribes. He argues that these 
examples show that the Prophet had a political mission, not only a spiritual one 
(Ammara, 1991, pp. 332–350). 
 
4.2.3 Leading Islamists’ Views 
Expectedly, the leading Islamist figures also argue that Islam and state are inseparable, 
and the Prophet was the political leader of the first Islamic state. For instance, the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Hassan al-Banna states “whoever 
speculates that religion or, more precisely, Islam, is not concerned with politics or that 
politics is not within its realm of inquiry has wronged himself and has wronged his 
knowledge by this [sort of] Islam” (Balqazīz, 2009, p. 122). For Banna, it would be difficult 
to achieve a “good society” without an Islamic state. As Ahmad Moussalli states Banna’s 
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perception of Islam was “as a complete system regulating all aspects of life and including 
a system of social norms, government, legislation, law, and education,” which cannot be 
materialized without establishing an Islamic state (Moussalli, 2013, p. 133). 
 
Maududi is another figure who argued that an Islamic state has to be formed to serve 
religion. To him, the faith would never have been practiced if Islam had not been located 
in the centers of power (Nasr 1996). Maududi believes that Islam is “an all-embracing 
social order where nothing is superfluous, and nothing is lacking” (White & Siddiqui, 
2013, p. 145). Nasr states that for Maududi, “If there were no Islamic state, the whole 
reason for revelation would come into question, for religious teachings were not sent by 
God to be ignored” (Nasr, 1996, p. 81).  
 
Similarity, one of the influential scholars Yusuf al-Qaradawi who has written several 
books on Islam and politics, believes that the Prophet established an Islamic state, and 
he was the first leader of the state (Qaradawi, 1991, 1998). He says “the Islamic state is 
a dogmatic and ideological one and it is based on creed and ideology. It is not a mere 
“security device” to preserve the Ummah from internal aggression or external invasion 
rather its function is much greater than that” (Qaradawi, 1998, p. 20). Qaradawi gives 
several reasons why he believes that the concept of “state” exists in Islam: First, he 
believes that the verses in the Quran give a clear message to Muslims to be unified and 
obey the one who is in power. Secondly, Qaradawi argues, historically, the Prophet did 
whatever he could do to form an Islamic state, meaning that he called Arab tribes to 
embrace Islam, and invited them to construct a “homeland.” According to him, the goal 
of the migration to Medina in 622 was to establish an independent Islamic state for 
constructing a Muslim society (Qaradawi, 1998, p. 15). Thirdly, the nature of Islam, he 
argues, supports the formation of a state. Because Islam opposes anarchy and disorder, 
he implies that it would be nonsense to think that Islam does not have a state project. 
To demonstrate how the nature of Islam advocates a state, Qaradawi states that the 
Prophet ordered Muslims to arrange into rows during prayers and choose the most 
 60 
 
knowledgeable person to lead the prayer, and the Prophet said that if you are traveling 
with someone, appoint one as your leader (Qaradawi, 1998, p. 17). Moreover, he argues 
that even if the first and second proofs did not exist, the nature of Islam itself would 
inevitably require an establishment of a state (Qaradawi, 1998, p. 20). 
 
4.2.4 Western Scholars and Orientalists’ Views 
Finally, some western scholars and orientalists argue that unlike Christianity, Islam does 
not recognize a separation of religion and state, which means that the Prophet 
Muhammad was not only the Messenger of God but also a person who is responsible 
with the world matters of his community. To sum up, I listed several quotes from the 
scholars who argue that religion and state are inseparable in Islam: 
 
Dr. V. Fitzgerald: Islam is not a mere religion, but a political system. In spite of the 
fact that in the recent years have occurred some Muslims who claim themselves 
to be “Modernists” attempting to separate between the two aspects. The whole 
Islamic structure is fundamentally based on the fact that both aspects are 
indispensable. 
 
C. A. Nallion: Muhammad has simultaneously established a religion and a state 
whose limits were preserved along his whole life. 
 
Dr. Schacht: Islam is more than a religion. It represents political and legal theories. 
In brief, it is a complete cultural system that includes religion and state together. 
 
R. Strothmann: Islam is a religious, political phenomenon or its founder was a 
Prophet, wise politician, or a statesman. 
 
D. B. MacDonald: Here, in Medina, the first Islamic state was formed and the basic 
principles for Islamic Law were laid down. 
 
Sir. T. Arnold: The Prophet was, at the same time, head of religion and head of 
state. 
 
Gibb: Then, it was clear that Islam was not just individual religious acts, and it was 
a must to establish its distinctive community, that has its own style in ruling along 
with its own laws and regulations (Ammara, 1991; Avva, 2011; Qaradawi, 1998, 
pp. 31–32; Rayyıs, 1995). 
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Several other scholars also make similar arguments: 
 
Rosenthal: “The core of … umma was, of course, formed by the "believers"…. 
Muhammad's original mission as a purely religious call inevitably attained its 
consummation in a political organization…” (E. I. J. Rosenthal, 2009b, p. 25). 
Rosenthal: “The distinction between secular and spiritual for Muslim has no 
meaning” (E. I. J. Rosenthal, 2009a, p. 1). 
 
Ann. K. S. Lampton: “Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, believes in the divine 
origin of government. … The distinction between secular and spiritual for the 
Muslim has no meaning. The only distinction is between believer and unbeliever” 
(Lambton, 1981, p. 1). 
 
Kerr: “In professing to provide man with a political and legal system as well as a 
spiritual faith, Islam denies at the outset the conception familiar in Christendom 
of a separation between temporal and spiritual matters” (Kerr, 1966, p. 3). 
 
Patricia Crone: “Muhammad was active among warring tribes and had to take 
political and military action if he was to accomplish his mission. The religion could 
not survive without communal embodiment, and the community could not 
survive without defense. Hence it had to have a political organization” (Crone, 
2005, p. 12).  
 
Patricia Crone even argues that the Prophet had both prophethood and kingship mission. 
She claims that it was believed in Islam that “the more power you have, the better you 
can do” to spread the message of the religion (Crone, 2005, p. 11). She also argues that 
the article “whenever you disagree about something, the matter should be referred to 
God and Muhammad” in the constitution of Medina shows that the Prophet was the 
ultimate decision-maker. In other words, the Prophet was the leader of a political 
community (Crone, 2005, p. 13). Finally, she states, “thanks to Muhammad’s career, 
Muslims came to think of prophets as the paradigmatic founders of states” (Crone, 2005, 
p. 13). 
 
As it can be seen, both medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars, as well as western 
and orientalist scholars, believe that the Prophet possessed a political authority, and 
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there cannot be a separation between spiritual and secular in Islam. Ironically, Qaradawi, 
Avva, and Rayyis give references to orientalist scholars to support their claims against 
those like Ali Abd ul-Raziq and other modernist Muslims. In fact, Qaradawi and Rayyis 
aim to discredit the modernist arguments about Islam by giving references to Orientalists 
after discussing the Islamic sources. Their message was clear: ‘See! Even the orientalists 
accept the fact that the Prophet had a political mission and established a state, why don’t 
you, the modernists Muslims, admit the fact!’ 
 
4.3. Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s Response to Mainstream 
Ali Abd ul-Raziq holds several bold claims about political power and state in Islam as I 
listed above, which are entirely against all the mainstream arguments about the nature 
of state in Islam. Although Raziq was not the first one who argued that ‘there is no Islamic 
state, and the Prophet was not a political figure,’ Raziq has been considered as the father 
of the unorthodox views. As a result, he is labeled as one of the “First Muslim secularists” 
(Gazi 2009). However, as Yücesoy explains, well before Raziq, some Muslims in the 
medieval era argued against the concept of political authority and the necessity of a 
state:   
 
Some Mutazilis thought they could do away with the imamate and argued for a 
notion of self-government instead of rulership…. As was the case with daily 
prayers, which could be performed with or without a prayer leader, they 
reasoned that the community was free to elect or not elect an imam as long as 
individuals knew their personal obligations (farai’d), which can be fulfilled 
without the coercive power of the imam (Yücesoy 2011, 14). 
 
If some Muslims put forward the similar arguments long before Raziq wrote his book, 
why is Raziq being criticized so vehemently over several decades as if he was the pioneer 
of these arguments? It seems to me that Raziq owes his popularity to the historical 
context of the 1920s as I explained in the first chapter. His disorganized thoughts and 
assertive language stirred anger in the Islamic world where people had to find a way to 
adopt the new system of government after the abolition of the caliphate. While Muslim 
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scholars such as Rashid Rida tried to arrange meetings to discuss and even resist the new 
system, Raziq brought the long-forgotten arguments back to the discussion.  
 
4.3.1 Raziq’s Main Arguments 
Raziq believed that the Prophet was a messenger of God, not a king, and he had a divine 
authority rather than temporal authority. For him, the Prophet possesses much more 
power than a temporal ruler does. He states that even if the Prophet has a similar role 
to any political leader, the Prophet does not share his power with anyone else. Raziq 
maintains, “it is a function that enables him to see directly into the hearts of people, to 
rend asunder their veils so as to gain insight into their innermost recesses” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 
2012, 83). Perhaps, no one would be against the argument that the Prophet’s authority 
comes from the heart and the consent of people, but Raziq goes beyond these 
arguments later in his book. For instance, Raziq states that “Muhammad was strictly a 
Messenger, entrusted with a purely religious mission, uncompromised by any desire for 
kingship or temporal power” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 81). Similarly, he argues that the Sunna 
of the Prophet also explicitly shows that the Prophet did not want to be treated as a 
political leader. As evidence, he states that the Prophet once said to a man who feared 
when he saw the Prophet “Be calm, for I am neither a king nor a tyrant. I am but the son 
of a Qurayshi woman who used to partake of salted meat” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 92).  
 
While Raziq attributes a uniqueness to the Prophet’s authority, he also reduces the 
Messenger’s power to ‘only spiritual’ matters, which is where he receives most of the 
objections. Nevertheless, in the following pages of his book, Raziq self-contradicts 
himself because he states that the Prophet “deals with relations of the body as well as 
the mind, on earth as well as in heaven. He is concerned with things of this world as well 
as the next” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 84). Moreover, Raziq believed that the Prophet was not 
a founder of an empire or a state, and he was not preaching in favor of temporal 
authorities or kingdom in the world. Kingdom, empire, political power, and so on these 
are what kings are interested in, not a messenger of a God. However, one can ask if the 
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Prophet’s authority is much more powerful than the temporal king’s power, why then 
the Prophet does not have the power that a king who does not have religious authority 
possess. 
 
While Raziq does not accept that the Prophet was a political leader and formed a state, 
he became in a self-contradictory position to write “the state of the Prophet” and “the 
Prophet’s state” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 76). Similarly, in the following pages, Raziq 
contradicts himself: He states, “We do find activities in the career of the Prophet which 
appear to be political and which seem to indicate an exercise of imperial or stately 
power” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 94). Azimli also stresses that Raziq’s arguments are full of 
discrepancies and the Prophet’s role in the process of the Constitution of Medina and his 
other practices in Medina disprove Raziq’s arguments about the mission of the Prophet 
(Azimli, 2002, p. 65). Azimli argues that even if Islam does not propose a state system, 
Islam does have an ideal state project. For instance, the Quran consists of several 
essential factors that a model Muslim state should have such as justice and consultation 
(shura). Raziq argues that one of the reasons why the Prophet did not form a state or 
government is that whereas the Prophet likes simplicity, the systems of government are 
complicated and convoluted.  
 
4.3.1.1 Ambiguous state structure  
In the second and last parts of the Islam and the Foundations of Political Power, Raziq 
first deals with whether there was a governmental organization during the time of the 
Prophet (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, pp. 59–111). He specifically discusses the judiciary system, 
and it seems as if he was convinced that the system was not ambiguous, he would accept 
the fact that the Prophet had formed a government. However, he believes that juridical 
practices of the Prophet were vague and unclear because of several reasons (ʻAbd al-
Rāziq, 2012, pp. 61–62). For instance, he states that while the position of Ali who was 
sent by the Prophet on a mission to Yemen can be considered as the position of a judge, 
it may also be considered as a tax collector. Similarly, there is uncertainty about the 
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mission of Mu’ad ibn Jabal who was sent by the Prophet to the province of Janad. Raziq 
states that while Ibn Abd Al-Barr believes that Muad was sent as a judge, Al-Ghassani 
argues that Mu’ad was treasurer, and Ibn Maymun sees Mu’ad as an official in charge of 
the prayers. As a result, Raziq maintains that this unclear picture convinces him of the 
fact that there was neither an organizational structure during the time of the Prophet 
nor a system of government (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 64). Furthermore, Raziq asks several 
questions to convince his readers: 
 
If it is true that the Prophet instituted a political regime; or if he at least set into 
motion a process leading to such a state of affairs, why should this “state” have 
remained bereft of the paraphernalia typical of any temporal power? Why did 
scholars inquiring into this subject fail to identify the governors of this regime? 
Why was it not possible to know the procedures for the nomination of judges? 
Why did the Prophet not speak to his subjects about government and about the 
rules of popular consultation? Why did he keep the theologians in doubt about 
such an important subject as the system of government that he himself had 
introduced? (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 74). 
 
 
While the mainstream scholars believe that the Prophet had a comprehensive 
administration in the medieval context, Raziq states that other than conflict resolution 
and general jurisdiction over provinces, none of the other functions such as 
“management of finance” and “the upkeep of law and order” can be observed during 
the Prophet’s time (ʻAbd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 64). He sees these functions as the 
fundamentals for even a rudimental state. He would confidently accept the authority 
during the time of the Prophet as “a system of government,” if these functions ever 
existed. Raziq states “the Prophet from time to time delegated certain limited functions, 
such as command over troops, supervision of property, the leadership of the prayer, 
instruction in the Qur’an, and the propagation of the faith, to certain individuals. These 
assignments were not continuous or permanent…” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 64). However, 
Raziq states that none of the features of temporal power can be observed during the 
Prophet; he forcefully argues that the order of the Prophet was not a type of government 
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or a state and the community around the Prophet was not a political movement, and he 
was not a king or prince (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 96).  
 
Raziq made another mistake in comparing the functions of a typical state during the 
Prophet’s time to those of the modern state structures. He states that today’s states are 
well-organized powers and there was not such a powerful state organization during the 
time of the Prophet. Raziq states that the Prophet had somehow an authority over his 
community but “this is not the same as the power or authority that a temporal ruler 
wields over his subjects” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 82). Abdurrazzak Sanhoury argues that the 
Prophet’s state was not the same as a typical modern nation-state; however, it does not 
mean that Prophet’s state did not have institutions that a state would have such as the 
tax system, the judicial system or the military institutions (Radhan, 2014, p. 145). 
Sanhoury believes that “Muhammad accomplished a religious and political unification of 
Arabia and that he even centralized the administration by directly sending governors to 
Yemen and other provinces” (Radhan, 2014, p. 146). For Rayyis, the Prophet performed 
all the functions of both political and religious state (Radhan, 2014, p. 146). 
 
However, Raziq asks the question of why historians did not find evidence and historical 
information about the state officials such as governors, generals, judges during the time 
of the Prophet? He asks the question because he argues that historians conducted 
extensive research on the state officials during the first four caliphs, but they could not 
find much information about the officials during the Prophet’s time. It seems, for Raziq, 
that the lack of information can be a sign that in fact there were no state officials at all. 
Raziq argues that, when it comes to the officials who were elected by the Prophet and 
their duty, historians use vague and inconsistent statements (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 64). 
Therefore, he concludes that it is difficult to observe a general system adopted by the 
Prophet, and one cannot be sure whether the Prophet appointed a person for a specific 
task. With this discussion, Raziq wants to open a gate to the inquiry of “the exact nature 
of the Prophet’s mission,” which means that he wants to discuss whether the Prophet 
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was a Messenger or a head of state. He asks, “was the Prophet, a king?” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 
2012, 65). 
 
4.3.1.2 Spiritual and temporal power 
Raziq argues what is essential is  
 
whether the Prophet’s sovereignty over his people stemmed from his role as the 
Apostle of God or whether it was an imperial phenomenon; whether the 
occasional display of power in his actions points to the presence of a state, or of 
a spiritual authority; and whether the nature of the entity over which he presided 
was political, or whether it was rather a strictly and exclusively religious 
community. In a word, again, what is essential to determine is whether the 
Prophet was only an apostle of God or both (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 87).  
 
He believes that the spiritual and temporal power should not be confused. He compares 
the two types of authority as follows:  
 
The former aims at a leadership over men in the path of justice and initiation into 
the Truth. The latter has to do with the organization of the vital requirements of 
society and the occupation of land. The former aims at the establishment of 
religion; the latter serves the interests of this world strictly. The former provides 
religious and spiritual direction; the latter is a purely secular enterprise. How far 
they are from each other! What a distance lies between them – between religion, 
on the one hand, and politics, on the other! (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 85).  
 
4.3.1.3 The Prophet or King? 
Raziq states that there has not been an inquiry about whether the Prophet was a king 
among the Muslim, and he argues that questioning this idea does not harm their faith. 
He believes that “the mission of the Prophet is very different from the position of a king 
and there is no necessary link between these two” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 68). Raziq argues 
that the Prophet did not involve into political matters of tribes and he did not intend to 
change the system of the tribes. He asks several questions: 
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If the establishment of a state had indeed been part of his appointed purpose, 
how could he have left it so vague that the Muslims, finding themselves entirely 
in the dark [after his death], fell to killing one another… How could he have left 
his people in such utter confusion as that which swept over them and instantly 
plunged them into the most vicious violence even before they could see his body 
to the grave? (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 104). 
 
Raziq also gave the reference the phrase that is attributed to the Prophet: ‘You know the 
worldly matters better than me.’ Here Raziq selectively chooses hadiths that could 
strengthen his arguments. Azimli argues that the Prophet used this sentence in a specific 
context for fertilization of palms (Azimli, 2002, p. 65).  Muhammad al-Bahi and Mehmet 
Gormez also believe that Raziq used the hadiths out of its context (Görmez, 1995; 
Radhan, 2014, p. 145). But clearly, there are also many examples that could challenge 
his arguments. 
 
Raziq states that most of the Prophets that known are only the messengers of the God, 
not a king such as Jesus or Joseph. Here, Raziq gives Jesus's famous statement again: 
“render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s,” which he wants to 
show that Jesus supported the idea of obeying Cesar and his authority. Raziq states that 
lay Muslims and theologians generally see the Prophet as a Messenger-King sent by God. 
He claims that this argument is the prevailing view among Muslims as well as opinions of 
theologians such as Ibn Khaldun and Tahtawi (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 67). However, this 
argument is not true given the medieval scholars’ views about the Prophet. Ibn Khaldun 
does not see the Prophet as a King, and in fact “kingship” is what Ibn Khaldun uses in a 
negative context to describe the evolution of the caliphate to kingship. Therefore, Ibn 
Khaldun does not see the Prophet as King. Unlike Raziq, Ibn Khaldun locates the Prophet 
authority in a place where encompasses all the authority that a king would have. 
Similarly, other medieval scholars like Mawardi, Ghazali or Taymiyyah do not see the 
Prophet as a king since King would only have a worldly power and not appointed by the 
God. However, some orientalists like Patricia Crone see the claim that the Prophet was 
a king (Crone, 2005). Raziq criticizes Ibn Khaldun for considering Islam both as a message 
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and as a system of legislation and encompassing both spiritual and temporal power. In 
fact, as I show above, not only Ibn Khaldun but also medieval and contemporary scholars 
consider Islam as a comprehensive religion. Raziq argues that the idea that Islam 
proposes a system of legislation and a state model is “an unfounded interpretation.” He 
argues “it is not justified by any authoritative source. Worse still, it is in contradiction to 
the significance of the Prophet’s message” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 74). 
 
4.3.1.4 The Prophet and coercion 
Raziq denies the political authority of the Prophet because he believes that the mission 
of the Prophet was persuasion and exhortation to the good and not by force or violence 
(ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 71). This argument is a component of his theory of the caliphate. As 
I showed in the previous chapter, he argued that the caliphate was a political, and a 
matter of coercion and violence. Conversely, the mission of the Prophet was not to be a 
king and form a state, and he did not use oppression and violence for spreading his divine 
message to people. Raziq believes that while Prophet’s authority came from God and 
was born in the heart of people, the power of a king is material and has nothing to do 
with the hearth of people. Raziq states that if Muslims accept that the Prophet did not 
use force, then they should conclude: The Prophet did not form a state since states built 
based on coercion and violence and cannot survive without them (Hourani 1983, 187). 
For instance, Raziq state that “No prophet, throughout history, has ever tried to bring 
people to believe in God by the sword, or conquered a people so as to convince them to 
join his faith” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 71).  
 
As I stated above, Ibn Taymiyyah did not believe that a caliphate is necessary for Muslims 
to practice their religion as long as a mundane authority existed. In that sense, Ibn 
Taymiyyah could be a reference for Raziq. One can wonder why Ali Abd ul-Raziq did not 
mention Taymiyyah’s name or why he did not influence by Taymiyyah’s view of the 
caliphate. The answer is that while Ibn Taymiyyah does not see the caliphate as a 
necessary institution, he sees the sword as a way to preserve religion (İbn Teymiye, 
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1999). However, Raziq denies that coercion and violence cannot be the tools for 
spreading Islam, which the Quran indicates. For Raziq, oppression and violence are 
state/political apparatus not religious. In contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah believes that “anyone 
who deviates from the Quran will be corrected by force, and that is why the Quran and 
the sword cooperate in preserving religion” (Qaradawi, 1998, p. 19). 
 
As for how he explains why the concept of the caliphate is not Islamic, Raziq lists several 
verses and hadiths to show that the Prophet did not have an interest in gaining political 
power. He argues that these verses show that “Quran explicitly forbids a view of the 
Prophet as a custodian of men” and does not allow the use of violence to make belief in 
the faith (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 88).  However, control and domination are the tools for 
temporary leaders. According to Raziq, the Prophet was not ordered to force people into 
spreading the message, and Raziq gives another list of verses to show that the Prophet 
Muhammad was only a messenger. (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 89–91). Raziq quotes various 
Quranic verses in the book to strengthen his arguments, but Azimli states if Raziq 
believes the verses that he uses in the book to convince readers as if Quran does not 
indicate anything about political authority, Raziq’s knowledge of Quran is extremely 
limited (Azimli, 2002, p. 64). 
 
4.3.1.5 Jihad 
While Raziq argues that the Prophet shared his message through persuasion, not 
coercion. He states that the Prophet “secured this union by means of the word and by 
means of the sword” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 86). He believes that Jihad was a means among 
other means that the Prophet used for reaffirmation of his teaching and reinforcement 
of his message, and from his definition of “jihad,” he sees it as “violent and brutal” (ʻAbd 
al-Rāziq 2012, 95). Broucek claims that despite Prophet participated in wars, Raziq 
believes the Prophet fight but not because of his prophetic mission but because of his 
“personal decisions” (Broucek, 2012, p. 177). 
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Görmez argues that Raziq unintentionally pictures the Prophet as if who was “a fighter 
for wealth and power for his state” (Görmez, 1995, p. 230). He argues that one cannot 
clearly understand Raziq’s arguments about political authority during the Prophet 
because of his conflicting statements (Görmez, 1995, p. 230). As far as I am concerned, I 
see a major fallacy because while Raziq believes that jihad became a means for 
establishing an Arab state, which was political and has nothing to do with religious 
mission, during the first Caliph Abu Bakr, he states the Prophet also used jihad as a 
means. The questions are if jihad is a political means why did the Prophet use if he did 
not have political goals? If the Prophet spread his message through persuasion and if the 
message was born in the heart, then why did the Prophet apply “jihad”? Similarly, 
Rosenthal also asks: If the Prophet engaged in holy wars, how can Raziq argue that force 
is incompatible with Islam? (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 94). 
 
4.3.1.6 Abu Bakr as the first King 
While Raziq argued that the Prophet did not form a political organization or state, the 
first caliph Abu Bakr established the first Arab state, which had nothing to do with Islam. 
Rosenthal states that Raziq implies that the early Muslims and the caliphs -Khulafa 
Rashidun- “have betrayed” the mission the Prophet by focusing on the temporal 
authority (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 86). Brouncek states that “By calling Abu Bakr Islam’s first 
king, ‘Abd al-Raziq knowingly confused the distinction between the rightly-guided caliphs 
and the rulers who followed them” (Broucek, 2012, p. 182). Raziq believes that Islam was 
not revealed only for Arabs, and the message of Islam is the universe and cannot be 
limited with Arab entities or states (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 99). Unlike the Prophet, Abu Bakr 
“became the first ruler in the history of Islam” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 109). Raziq argues 
that Abu Bakr created an Arab state and despite the state had a significant impact on 
spreading the message and preservation of Islam, the Arab state still was a secular 
temporal in nature (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 109). 
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Raziq implies that if there were a need for a formation of an “Islamic state,” God will 
certainly make it happen. What Abu Bakr formed was not an Islamic state rather it was 
only an Arab state that concerns about temporal political power in the world. Raziq 
states that “the new state created by the Arabs was an Arab state and an Arab power. 
While Islam, as we know, is a religion addressed to all humanity, a religion that is neither 
Arab nor non-Arab” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 109).  
 
Raziq uses the term “regime of Abu Bakr” and argues that the regime did not have any 
religious significance (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 114). When Abu Bakr was chosen as the first 
caliph, some did not accept, but they still believed in the Prophet and his message. He 
argues that the wars, conflicts, and struggles during Abu Bakr were all political and not 
on the name of religion. Thus those who opposed the “regime of Abu Bakr” cannot be 
seen as “apostasies” and launch a war on them. (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 113). Raziq argues 
the early Muslims were aware of the fact that they were establishing a temporal 
authority, not a religious, which allowed disagreement or rejections (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 
110). If it were seen as sacred, no one would be against the temporal authorities. 
However, Sanhoury believes that because there was a rejection of paying the alms 
(zakat), which was one of the cornerstones of Islam, Abu Bakr’s wars of apostasy were 
religious wars not political (Radhan, 2014, p. 175). 
 
4.3.1.7 Scientific method 
Raziq believed that he inquiries the political system during the Prophet in a scientific 
way. He stresses “scientific” word in many places to show that the previous scholars did 
not examine and accepted many assumptions without concrete evidence. He states, “A 
scientific mind will not dismiss this line of reasoning without examining it” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 
2012, 75). He maintains that people are ignorant of historical information and no one 
should be completely certain about anything that may not be true. James Broucek argues 
that Raziq adopted the “scientific” method from his professor Carlo Nallino (Broucek, 
2012, p. 187). 
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He implies that even if it has been argued or assumed by many that the Prophet was the 
political leader and he formed a state in Medina, because of this argument may not be 
correct. He wants to show that he may not hold the truth about system of rule by the 
Prophet, but by doing that he also wants to challenge the Sunni Muslim scholars 
confidence: ‘Even I who utilize a scientific method to the debate about system of 
government during Prophet is not a hundred percent sure, how can you, traditionalists 
who carry a lot of assumptions be so confident?’ Raziq believes that “as long as the 
present evidence is not refuted by new data, this possibility need not prevent us from 
wondering about the real origin and significance of the confusion and ambiguity 
concerning the Prophet’s system of authority which we have pointed out” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 
2012, 76). 
 
4.3.1.8 Secularism/laicism 
It can be said that Raziq believes in secularism/laicism in the sense that he wants to 
differentiate religious power and political/temporal power. While Raziq is known as 
Muslim secularist or pioneer of Islamic laicism, he did not define himself as secular or 
laic. Considering his views about the separation of spiritual from worldly matters, it can 
be claimed that Raziq supports a type of secularism. Because secularism does not have 
a positive connotation in the Islamic world, it should be explained in what sense Raziq 
can be called as “Muslim secularist.” For instance, Raziq does not support an irreligious 
society and does not call for it, nor does he have any plan to change people’s religious 
belief from top-down processes. What he stresses is that the spiritual power and 
temporal power are not the same.  
 
Muhammad al-Bahi claims that Raziq attempts “Christianization of Islam” as he gives 
references to Jesus in several times in the book (Radhan, 2014, p. 152). A similar 
argument can also be seen in the views of Black who states that unlike orientalists and 
Islamists, Raziq sees the Prophet Muhammad as Christian scholars see Christ, and Raziq 
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wants to open gates for developing a new political system that could help to compete 
with other nations (Black, 2011, p. 331). Belkeziz states that the government that Raziq 
advocates has a civil and political character, which is different than sultanate or caliphate 
(Balqazīz, 2009, p. 105). While Sanhoury seems to agree with Raziq when he believes 
that the state of Arabia was primitive, he still argues that the political institutions relied 
on religious concerns and the terms “religion” and “state” were not two separate entities 
(Radhan, 2014, p. 151). Imarah criticizes Raziq for separating state matters from Islam. 
He argues that the relationship between religion and state is not a matter of separation 
rather it is a matter of differentiation (Radhan, 2014, p. 151). He argues that consultation 
(shura) that the Quran explicitly advocates is a matter of world and political issues. 
Similarly, Abderrazak Sanhury, Muhammad al-Bahi, and Rayyis criticize Raziq for his 
selectivity.  They argue that Raziq omits Medina verses that have more information 
about authority and relies more on the Mecca verses. Rayyis argue that the verses 
(Quran 4:58-59) that Raziq denies are in fact about legislation and ruling (Radhan, 2014, 
pp. 142–143). Mamduh Hiqqi argues that Islam and state are inseparable (Ali, 2009, p. 
107). Hiqqi argues that Islam is a different religion, which has its system of government. 
He argues that “The Islamic order is neither absolutist-monarchic, nor constitutional, nor 
representative, nor communist, nor socialist -- the system is called “Islam” (Radhan, 
2014, p. 171). 
 
4.3.1.9 Umma: Spiritual Union 
Raziq believes that Islam constitutes a religious union, and it is a spiritual unity, not a 
political or imperial unity. He maintains that as long as one agrees that the unity is 
spiritual, it is not essential to calling the unity as “state” “empire” or any other words 
(ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 86). However, Muhammad Amara asks how it can be possible that 
a Prophet has a state or imperial power, but his community was only a religious union 
(Radhan, 2014, p. 145)? Raziq states that the umma (community) around the Prophet 
was not a political entity but only a religious one, and the reason why all the people came 
together not because of being a state citizen but because of believing in a religion and a 
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prophet. He argues “The Arabs gathered themselves around him as an act of love for 
God, an act that earned them the favor of the divine revelation, the opening of the 
heavens and the commandments and prescriptions of the Lord” (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 
103).  
 
Raziq argues while there may be a single unified religion in the world, it is impossible to 
see a single government (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 94). He argues that there were many kinds 
of people who accepted Islam. These people from not only different identities but also 
ruled under different political systems such as those who embraced Islam and continued 
to live under Byzantium and as independent entities. There were significant differences 
between the operations of government, customs and many aspects of material and 
economic life (ʻAbd al-Rāziq 2012, 100). 
 
Amara argues that if Quran does not explicitly prohibit the Prophet to engage with ruling 
a community, and if the Prophet commands and appoints governors, tax collectors, and 
imams, and if Muslims have to follow the Sunna of the Prophet, then they also need to 
form a government.  Muhammad Al Bahi also argues that religious rituals can only be 
practiced in a world where Muslims are protected, which requires a political system 
(Radhan, 2014, pp. 143–169). 
 
4.4. Intellectuals influenced by Raziq 
 There were several people in 1930s in Egypt who shared similar ideas with Raziq, for 
instance, Taha Husayn (1889-1976), Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Hatina, 2000, pp. 38–
46) are the best known. Similarly, many other Egyptians like 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, 
Ahmad Amin, Yusuf Idris, Zaki Najib Mahmud, Najib Mahfuz, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Shaykh 
Khalid Muhammad Khalid –he was forced to change his views later on– and Faraj Ali Foda 
had similar views with Raziq’s (Najjar, 1996). The names above have suffered for many 
years because of their opinions, even some of them like Faraj Ali Foda assassinated in 
1992 (Black, 2011, p. 331). Although scholars that I discuss their arguments in this part 
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may not entirely agree with Raziq, some scholars like Nasr Hamid Abu Zeyd, Luay Radhan 
and James Broucek argue that Raziq influenced Ahmed An-Naim, Muhammad Sa'id al-
Asmhawi, Fuad Zakariya, Munawir Sadzali, Ghaleb Bencheikh, Abdurahman Wahid, 
Tayeb Al-Oqbi, Mohammad Talbi and Mohamad Charfi (Abu-Zaid, 2006; Radhan, 2014; 
Broucek, 2012). However, I believe it is difficult to argue that these intellectuals saw 
Raziq as the mastermind of their views, and they may even be offended by such an 
analogy. Since I have limited space, I select some of them (the one who most engage 
with state/religion issue in an Islamic context), namely Abdullahi Ahmad An-Naim, 
Muhammad Sa'id al-Asmhawi, Fuad Zakariya, Munawir Sadzali and Abdurahman Wahid. 
 
Abdullahi Ahmad An-Naim, a law professor, strongly believes that Muslims need to 
establish secular state. In his “Islam and the Secular State,” he argues that “in order to 
be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only way one can be a Muslim, I 
need a secular state” (Na’im, 2008). Even though Naim can be seen as a scholar 
influenced by Raziq, Naim gives Raziq’s name only in two times in the beginning of the 
book. Part of the reason is that Naim influenced more by his teacher Mahmoud 
Mohamed Taha (Naim, 2008, p.2). In the beginning of the book, Naim states that Raziq 
“conclusively demonstrated the validity of this premise (religious law enforced by a state 
is not necessarily Islamic) from a traditional Islamic perspective more than eighty years 
ago (Naim, 2008, pp. 1-2). By separating Islam from state, Naim’s ideas resemble to 
Raziq’s (Radhan, 2014; Broucek, 2012). For instance, Naim states:  
 
Islam is the religion of human beings who believe in it, while the state signifies 
the continuity of institutions like the judiciary and administrative agencies. This 
view is fundamentally Islamic, because it insists on the religious neutrality of the 
state as a necessary condition for Muslims to comply with their religious 
obligations (Naim, 2008, p. 4). 
 
Muhammad Sa'id al-Asmhawi was a High Court judge and known his critics against 
Islamists in Egypt. Like Raziq, he argued that the so-called religious state has been a 
disaster in the past and he advocated a civil administration (Shepard, 1996). Asmhawi 
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argues that government under the Prophet was religious; however, after him, a religious 
government has never been established and it cannot be found in the future (Shepard, 
1996, p. 48). He engaged with an etymological inquiry to show that there is no verse in 
the Quran that could provide a way of government (Fakhry, 2004, p. 379). In his one of 
the book, to criticize Islamists, he states  
 
That the politicization of religion or religiousness of politics nothing but acts of 
prostitution by iniquitous men or an act boorishness. For these acts enable 
opportunism to appear as an act in the name of religion; they allow the exploiter 
to legitimacy by way of [Quranic] verses; they transform lechery symbol in the 
name of the Sharia… (Sagiv, 1992).  
 
Fuad Zakariya was a professor of philosophy and advocated a secular state. Like 
Asmhawi, he was also very much against the politicized Islam. He argued that Islam and 
secularism were not contradictory terms (Gallagher, 1989). In a conference 1989, Zakaria 
supported secularism against Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, argued 
“Secular governments accept faith but reject the Shari'a. Secularism did not mean 
atheism but rather the separation of religion and State” (Gallagher, 1989, p. 211). 
Furthermore, he stated that rationalism, criticism, logic, and intellectual independence 
were all attributes of Islam. He argues that Islamists deliberately want to confuse the 
meaning of “secularism” (Wu, 2007).  
 
Munawir Sadzali was the former minister of religious affairs in the late 1980s in 
Indonesia. He was another advocator of renewal. Like all reformist, he also held a 
contextual approach to Islam and claimed that the Quran should be interpreted 
according to modern social circumstances. Like Raziq, he also claims that Quran and 
Sunna do not propose a particular type of state and Islam has nothing to do with 
regulating the issue of state affairs (Abū-Zaid, 2006, p. 63). He claims Muslims learned 
the concept of “Islamic state” from the Western colonialism; there is nothing in Islam as 
“Islamic state” that Muslims in both classical and medieval periods did not experience 
(Abū-Zaid, 2006, p. 63). Another Indonesian Abdurrahman Wahid also rejected the idea 
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that Islam presupposes a type of state. Like Sadzali, he was also a supporter of 
Indonesia’s secular state ideology, Pancasila, and supports minority rights and multi-
cultural society. Wahid had studied in modern schools, Al-Azhar as well as the University 
of Bagdad. He believed in a “cultural Islam” meaning that individual moral values, 
religious tolerance, protection of non-Muslims and heterodox Muslim sects and like 
other modernist seculars, he rejected “Political Islam” (Bruinessen, 2009).  
 
4. 5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed Ali Abd ul-Raziq’s arguments about political authority 
and state structure. I showed that Raziq received most of the criticisms because of the 
arguments that I analyze in the chapter. While Raziq’s views about the concept of the 
caliphate were not original, his opinions about political authority and system are 
authentic even eccentric despite the similarities with medieval anarchists’ views. Raziq 
believed that Muslims scholars have three main assumptions about political authority 
and the state structure of the Prophet, and he aimed to disprove the assumptions. I have 
argued that despite several contemporary figures who might have influenced by Raziq’s 
argument, Raziq has been mostly criticized because of his bold claims that I presented 
here such as the political authority of the Prophet and the claim about the nature of Abu 
Bakr’s authority.  
 
I tried to highlight Raziq’s arguments by comparing his arguments with medieval and 
contemporary Muslims scholars, Islamists as well as western and orientalist scholars’ 
views about the Islam and state relations. Because, all the people I discuss believed that 
Islam and state are inseparable, the Prophet was not only spiritual but also a political 
leader, I labeled them as “mainstream” even if they many different views about Islam in 
general.    
 
Raziq aimed to show an alternative path to understand politics and even to develop a 
new system based on their needs in the 1930s. However, his assertive language, 
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unorganized thoughts, and selective approach to the Quranic verses and hadiths made 
this goal difficult. Because Raziq and his followers were too unorthodox, they even 
created reactions which only after a couple of years, Hassan al-Banna formed the Muslim 
Brotherhood and demand an Islamic state.  
 
Indeed, many scholars argue that Raziq was right in the sense that Quran does not 
suggest a state system or regime type, and the Prophet did not explicitly appoint a 
person to be the leader of the community. However, claiming the Prophet’s authority as 
only spiritual and that jihad was a means of political, not religious, even a western-
oriented secular Muslim would not agree with Raziq. Raziq could have found supports 
among Muslims if he did not go too far with his arguments.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Perhaps, one of the critical developments in the history of Muslims in the last two 
centuries is the abolition of the caliphate. While few medieval scholars claimed that 
caliphate was not necessary, it can be argued that caliphate was treated as a religious 
institution among most Muslim scholars. Similarly, while the mainstream believes that 
the Prophet Muhammad was not only a religious leader, but he was also a political head 
of his community. In this thesis, I have explained how Ali Abd ul-Raziq challenged the two 
mainstream beliefs with his book, Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundation 
of Political Power). He claimed that the caliphate is not religiously mandatory institution 
in Islam. He held that neither the Quran nor Sunna justifies the concept of the caliphate, 
and there has never been consensus (ijma) in the history of the caliphate. Similarly, he 
maintained that the Prophet did not form a state and he was only the Messenger of God, 
who did not interest in gaining political authority in the world. Raziq was a unique scholar 
in the sense that he questioned the traditional concepts, the authority of the first caliph 
Abu Bakr, and even he claimed that jihad was a political means not religious. Because of 
these arguments, the Azharite ulama expelled Raziq from his duty as a sharia judge and 
took back his title of the sheikh. In this thesis, I have examined how Ali Abd ul-Raziq came 
to these different conclusions. I analyzed Raziq’s arguments, his sources and the logical 
integrity of his arguments based on evidence he shown. I argued that while Raziq did not 
introduce new ideas regarding the concept of the caliphate. For instance, ‘the institution 
of caliphate became a tool for political gain’ argument was also argued by Ibn Khaldun. 
However, Raziq’s arguments about the nature of the authority of the Prophet can be 
seen as too unorthodox. Indeed, Raziq criticized not because he thought the caliphate 
was not religiously mandatory institution but because of his statements about the nature 
of the authority of the Prophet and the first caliph Abu Bakr.       
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Before, analyzing Raziq’s case, I argued that Raziq’s personal history played a crucial role 
in his way of thinking about political concepts in Islam. Therefore, I first contextualized 
his own life story and the political circumstances when he published the book. I explained 
that coming from an elite family in Egypt, and he had the opportunity to meet many 
famous Egyptian intellectuals and politicians in his father and brothers’ circle. As his 
family, Raziq was also politically active, and even he ran for a seat in the parliament 
before 1925. While ten years old, he joined Azhar where the famous modernist Abduh’s 
legacy was still alive. In addition to his classic study in Azhar, he also attended in Egypt’s 
secular university. Perhaps, one of the distinctive features of Raziq was that he was not 
a scholar who found his references from the sources of the western scholars; instead, 
his sources and supporting ideas came from the intellectual history of Muslims. While he 
references twice the names of two British philosophers, most of the scholars believed 
that Raziq’s sources and influence were not western scholars and philosophy. Of course, 
even if Raziq does not refer western philosophy, his study in Egyptian University had 
affected his method of thinking and constructing his arguments. Some scholars claimed 
that Raziq’s courses on history by Orientalist scholars like Carlo Nallino in Egyptian 
University affected his way of thinking about historical developments.  
 
I argued that without the historical background of the 1920s, Raziq’s arguments would 
be difficult to understand. Before and after the abolition of sultanate and caliphate, 
some theoretical discussion rose about the nature of sultanate and caliphate. Some 
Turkish scholars believed that sultanate and caliphate could not be separated because 
they were both linked institutions. Raziq was a 35-year-old intellectual when the 
caliphate was abolished. He showed that he was aware of the debates that took place 
among Turkish elites. For Ali Abd ul-Raziq, the abolition of the caliphate was a 
progressive development because Muslims now could think about new political system 
according to their needs. I showed that for Raziq, the theoretical debates were vital 
because he constructed his arguments based on the discussion for and against the 
abolition. Raziq refers to Justice Minister Seyyid Bey’s speech in the Turkish Assembly in 
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his book, and his goal was to challenge the theoretical arguments of the Turkish and 
Egyptian scholars who believed that caliphate is a religiously necessary institution. While 
following the discussion in Turkey, his supporting party became a coalition partner In 
Egypt despite the party was not popular among Egyptian society. As a Liberal 
Constitutionalist, Raziq was in favor of constitutional monarchy and wanted to gain more 
support from the society as a political party.  
 
While initially, Azharite scholars were against the abolition, they eventually accepted the 
decision of the Turkish Assembly. They believed that Egypt could play a central role for 
re-establishment of the institution of the caliphate. The Egyptian media circulated news 
that Azhar scholars planned to organize an international caliphate conference to discuss 
the future of caliphate and lobbying King Fouad of Egypt for the new caliph. Raziq 
believed that King Fouad already held too much power, and if he were to possess a 
“religious legitimacy” than nothing could stop him to act freely. He believed that as a 
new constitutional monarchy, Egypt should adopt new concepts and ideas rather than 
outdated concepts.  
 
Raziq first explained the traditional understanding of the caliphate. He showed that how 
medieval scholars saw the concept of the caliphate. He then started to challenge all 
traditional beliefs about the caliphate. He claimed that Islam is silent about the political 
system and does not require the caliphate. He believed that the caliphate is only a 
political institution and does not have religious authority. Neither Quran nor Sunna 
justifies the caliphate, and there has never been a consensus of scholars on necessary of 
the caliphate. Some scholars argued that Muslim scholars did not discuss whether a 
caliph was necessary or not; instead, they discuss who and how to choose one as caliph. 
Therefore, the whole debates about the person not the nature of the caliphate. Raziq 
shares several historical information to show how the system of caliphate transformed 
to kingship. Scholars showed that Raziq was influenced by Ibn Khaldun’s methodology 
and examples that he showed about the transformation of the caliphate. However, even 
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if it seems Raziq influenced by Ibn Khaldun, I explained that Raziq differs from Ibn 
Khaldun in many aspects. For instance, Ibn Khaldun believed that after the four rightly 
guided caliphs, the caliphate system transformed to kingship, Raziq believed that the 
roots of the concept of the caliphate are in fact kingship. In other words, Raziq did not 
differentiate the four caliphs and implied that they were kings.   
 
I have shown that Raziq used a selective approach and tried to find the worst examples 
to justify his argument regarding the caliphate. In fact, Raziq was right when he asserted 
that the first debate among Muslims was whom to choose the caliph after the Prophet’s 
death. Indeed, many wars occurred between dynasties and empires for taking the 
institution of the caliphate over centuries, and the institution of the caliphate was used 
for political gains. However, Raziq also had to discuss what role the caliph had in the daily 
life of Muslims. Raziq was censured for stating only the worst examples and not debating 
other aspects of the caliphate. For instance, while Raziq relied upon Ibn Khaldun’s 
historical examples and supported Ibn Khaldun’s thesis that caliphate became kingship, 
he should have been aware of Ibn Khaldun’s statement about the importance of 
caliphate in the life of Muslims. Ibn Khaldun believed that Muslims need a caliph for their 
public interest and it should not be seen as a pillar of Islam. Of course, scholars like Rashid 
Rida criticized Raziq for his arguments about the caliphate, and Raziq’s caliphate 
arguments ruined King Fuad’s plan. However, Raziq did not receive most of the criticisms 
because of his discussions about the nature of the caliphate --many scholars like Seyyid 
Bey were already cognizant that the Quran does not advocate a system-- instead the 
Quran shows the general features of an ideal system and that the Prophet did not 
appoint a person to be the caliph after him. Because of Raziq’s views about the political 
authority of the Prophet, and his arguments about Abu Bakr, he became a controversial 
figure and destroyed his reputation scholar.  
 
Raziq did not stop with challenging the idea of the caliphate and started to question the 
whole system of governance during the Prophet. He asked whether the Prophet was a 
 84 
 
king or not, whether he formed a state and was the leader of the state or not. His answers 
to these questions were that the Prophet was not a king, he was only the Messenger of 
the God and did not interest in gaining political authority. As when he discussed 
caliphate, he states various verses and hadiths to show that Quran and Sunna do not 
justify the political authority of the Prophet. Moreover, he also claimed that Abu Bakr 
was the first king of the Arab state which did not have any religious mission even though 
it helped to spread the Message. Raziq goes too far by claiming that jihad is not a religious 
means but a political one. As justification, he asserted that the Quran does not allow 
coercion and violence to be used on people to force them to accept Islam.  
 
I showed that the mainstream view about the political authority of the Prophet is entirely 
different than what Raziq supported. Medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars, 
Islamists and even western and orientalist scholars believe that the Prophet was not only 
a spiritual leader, and religion and state are inseparable in Islam. I discussed that Raziq’s 
arguments were too unorthodox to be accepted by a Muslim. When analyzing Raziq’s 
arguments, one can easily see that he contradicts himself in some instances. For 
instance, while he denies that the Prophet did not form a state, in somewhere of the 
book, he uses “the Prophet’s state.” Similarly, while he claims that the authority of the 
Prophet is more than any other person in the world, but he denies that a prophet cannot 
have the authority that a political leader or a king possesses. I explained that while Raziq 
attributes a unique authority that a king cannot have, he also reduced the mission and 
power of the Prophet into “only spiritual” matters. 
 
If Raziq were not so radical with his arguments about dividing religious and political 
authority, he would have found many followers. Even the most secular Muslims did not 
argue that the Prophet did not have political power (Ashour, 2018). Indeed, as some 
scholars argued even the secular liberal constitutionalists in the 1920s did not hold the 
same ideas with Raziq, but they felt that had to support Raziq against the traditional 
scholars (Hassan, 2016). Similarly, had he had not used assertive language, or had he 
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developed his supporting arguments as Seyyid Bey did, he might not have criticized so 
vehemently. It can be speculated that Raziq’s arguments caused a traditional reaction. 
For instance, only after three years of Raziq’s case, Hassan al-Banna found the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. Although Raziq and his views may have had little effect or 
no direct effect on the formation of MB, views such as separating realms of religion and 
state was one of prominent criticisms that political islamists asserted during the 1930s.  
 
Although Raziq did not call himself as secular, scholars argue that Raziq justifies 
secularism or as Radhan states “Islamic laicism.” However, I argued that if Raziq 
supported secularism, it was only about separation of religion and state not more. For 
instance, he did not support a top-down secularism, nor did he suggest privatizing 
religion. In fact, Raziq would not accept a type of secularism that was hostile to religion 
or monopolizes religion. Perhaps, Raziq could have been a pioneer of a school of thought, 
if he stressed characteristics of good governance in Islam.  
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